July 22, 2022

How the Anti-Abortion Movement Remade America

[Cross-posted from Commonwealth Club Podcast]

UC Davis Professor of Law Mary Ziegler is one of the world’s leading authorities on the U.S. abortion wars and the history of reproductive rights in this country. Since the leak of a draft of a Supreme Court majority opinion that would overturn Roe v. Wade and the guaranteed right to an abortion, Ziegler has been one of the most sought-after experts on this issue.

Ziegler's timely new book Dollars for Life: the Antiabortion Movement and the Fall of the Republican Establishment, explores how the antiabortion movement remade the Republican Party and led to this current historic moment. She traces how the anti-abortion movement helped to revolutionize the rules of money in U.S. politics and persuaded conservative voters to focus on the federal courts. Ziegler offers a surprising new view of the slow drift to extremes in American politics and says it had everything to do with the strange intersection of right-to-life politics and campaign spending. Her previous books have explored the legal history of Roe v. Wade and the role of privacy rights in the abortion debate.

At a historic time that might mark a turnaround in abortion rights, The Commonwealth Club is pleased to host a true expert on the topic and this historic moment. You won't want to miss this important conversation. LISTEN to the episode.


Mary Ziegler

Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law; Author, Dollars for Life: the Antiabortion Movement and the Fall of the Republican Establishment

Vikrum Aiyer

Member, Inforum Advisory Board—Moderator

July 11, 2022

Constitutional Obligations as a Counter to Zero-Sum Thinking

[Cross-posted from The Hill]

By Alan Brownstein

The Constitution is a legal document that structures government and protects rights. Sometimes overlooked, however, is the reality that it is also a statement of values and principles on which the structure of government and the protection of rights is based.

These values and principles are not law — but they can suggest non-legal obligations that the government owes to its citizens or that citizens owe to each other.

Sometimes the obligation is stated explicitly as the foundation for the protection of a right. For example, a few months ago a racist killer influenced by white supremacist ideology and so-called “replacement theory” massacred Black Americans at a super market in Buffalo, N.Y. We know from bitter experience that white supremacy and replacement theory leads to violence and murder. We know this. Yet our constitutional system prohibits government from suppressing such pernicious speech.

The First Amendment generally prevents government from prohibiting speech that may influence individuals to commit crimes — even horrible crimes like the massacre in Buffalo. As the Supreme Court made clear in the seminal case of Brandenburg v. Ohio, this kind of speech, characterized as incitement, can only be prohibited if it will lead to imminent violence or unlawful conduct. This is a bedrock First Amendment rule today. The speech that warped the mind of the murderer in Buffalo cannot satisfy this incitement test because it did not immediately result in violence.

It is important to understand the reasoning justifying this meaning of incitement which protects such evil speech. The principle underlying the Brandenburg rule imposes an implicit obligation on the State and the people, a principle that requires us to counter evil counsel as loudly and forcefully as we can.

As Justices Holmes and Brandeis wrote in dissenting opinions that eventually led to the Brandenburg decision, dangerous speech could only by suppressed by government if the violence and other unlawful conduct it is inciting is imminent. If there is time to counter and refute evil counsel before it leads to harm, the constitutionally appropriate remedy for bad speech is good speech — not the prohibition of speech.

Thus, the foundation of this key free speech doctrine is grounded in the expectation that good people will not remain silent when they are confronted with evil speech.

It relies on the willingness of good people to speak up when there is time to do so and counter evil counsel to reduce the likelihood that bad speech will lead to unlawful acts or violence.

If good people are silent, evil speech cannot be effectively refuted.

Our free speech doctrine in a very real sense imposes a constitutional obligation on good people to speak up.

And that obligation falls with special weight on those of us who can speak the loudest and can be heard by the largest audiences. Government officials, among others, are in this category of speakers. Their official positions give them a microphone which extends the reach of their voice. The First Amendment doctrine about incitement prevents officials from silencing evil ideas — but the reasoning underlying that doctrine obliges them to speak up loudly against evil speech.

Other private speakers with loud voices — such as media and the clergy — are similarly obligated. And the average citizen’s voice, joining with others, needs to be heard as well.

Consider another principle underlying accepted constitutional law. The Fifth Amendment (made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment) explicitly requires the government to pay just compensation to the owner when it takes private property. But what justifies this compensatory requirement? The Supreme Court in Armstrong v. United States explained that the purpose of this provision was “to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”

This principle extends beyond compensating property owners for takings. It supports an implicit obligation to compensate — or at least mitigate — the costs incurred when the state furthers the public good in a way that disproportionately burdens individuals or a small group. Consider some examples. Government often accommodates religious exercise either as a result of constitutional mandates or as a discretionary political act. While the protection of religious exercise is particularly valuable to the individuals whose religious practices are being burdened, a strong argument recognizes that religious liberty is a public good. Our society in general benefits in important ways from our commitment to religious freedom.

Sometimes, however, accommodating religion imposes costs on identifiable third parties. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, a major issue involved the cost to women employees who would lose valuable insurance coverage for medical contraceptives if employers were exempt on religious grounds from the regulations requiring them to provide such health insurance coverage to their employees. If, as I suggest, religious liberty is a public good, a theory of constitutional obligation would support the government (the public as a whole) assuming the cost of such coverage for the women employees denied insurance coverage to protect the religious liberty of their employers.

Or consider the baker who, for religious reasons, will not create a cake to celebrate the wedding of a same-sex couple. If we exempt the baker from the requirements of anti-discrimination laws in the name of religious freedom, does the state have an obligation to alleviate the cost to the victims of the baker’s discrimination? In this situation, monetary or material compensation may not be feasible. But there may be other ways for the government to mitigate the burden same-sex couples will experience. Perhaps the government could make available through web sites a list of the wedding cake bakers in the area who would welcome the patronage of same-sex couples.

A final example involves state laws banning abortion, which require pregnant women to carry a fetus to term and birth. Here, because the woman wants to terminate her pregnancy, she is not a private beneficiary of the state law. The state believes by prohibiting abortion it is furthering the public good. Obviously, however, this law imposes very substantial burdens on women, including physical, psychological, and economic costs. The state and public will not be able to come close to sharing all of these costs. But it can do some things. For example, in the case of a fetus who will be born with severely debilitating ailments, the state could take on the responsibility of providing top quality medical care, assistance, and support for these children after birth.

Constitutional obligations, while not law, are derived from constitutional principles. They have many virtues, not the least of which is that they move us — perhaps only slightly but to some extent — away from constitutional controversies being entirely a zero-sum game.

January 10, 2022

King Hall Turkeys

Photo by Menesh Patel

As you can see, in the absence of students, a flock of turkeys has taken over the law school.

July 28, 2021

Business Scholarship Podcast: Afra Afsharipour on Bias, Identity and M&A

[Cross-posted from the Business Scholarship Podcast]

Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs Afra Afsharipour joins Andrew K. Jennings’ Business Scholarship Podcast to discuss her Wisconsin Law Review article "Bias, Identity and M&A." In the article, Afsharipour considers the non-value maximizing behavioral biases that can influence M&A activity, with a particular focus on senior management and a board’s ability to monitor senior management in the deal process. As part of this discussion, Afsharipour reviews recent empirical research on the relationship between management identity and M&A behavior.

Listen to the episode.

September 21, 2020

In celebration of Ruth Bader Ginsburg

By Marty West, Professor Emerita

(Remarks delivered at a Sept. 19 vigil in Davis honoring Justice Ginsburg’s life and legacy)

We are here tonight in Davis Central Park to celebrate the life of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. She has always been a part of my professional life and our lives have intersected many times. I will miss her.

In fall 1971, when I was beginning my second year of law school at Indiana University in Bloomington, Ruth argued and won her first case in the U.S. Supreme Court. The case was Reed v. Reed, and she convinced the Court to rule, for the first time, that a sex-based classification in a law violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court ruled that Idaho’s law automatically preferring a father over a mother as the executor of a child’s estate was unconstitutional.

In the fall of 1972, when I was a third-year law student, I went to a conference at Yale on how to create a law school course on Women and the Law. Ruth was there with her co-author Herma Hill Kay, law professor at UC Berkeley. They were the first ones to publish a law school textbook on sex-based discrimination.

As the founder of the ACLU Women’s Rights Project in New York in 1972, Ruth had been pleased with the result in Reed v. Reed, but really wanted the Court to find that a sex-based classification created a “suspect class,” mandating the highest level of judicial review, the same level of review given to a classification based on race. So Ruth tried again.

In 1973, Ruth argued Frontiero v. Richardson, involving a woman in the Air Force and her right to claim dependent’s benefits for her husband. The Court ruled in Ruth’s favor, and she got four members of the Court to agree with her that a sex-based classification created a “suspect class” subject to the most stringent judicial review. However, she did not get that fifth vote needed to adopt the higher standard.

That same year, 1973, I published my student law review article on the sex-based classifications in the Social Security system. I cited a lower-court case, then pending, brought by Ruth and the Women’s Rights Project: Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld. That case challenged the denial of any father’s benefits when a mother, covered by Social Security, died leaving young children. Ruth won the case before the Supreme Court in 1975, and the Court actually cited my law review article in the footnotes!

Ruth’s genius was demonstrated by her decision in these two cases to pursue fact patterns where striking down the sex classifications would benefit men, not women. Arguing before nine men on the Supreme Court, she wanted to find examples they could possibly identify with. She continued to follow this policy throughout the 1970s.

In 1976, I was the treasurer of the Equal Rights Amendment campaign in Indiana. We were the last state to ratify the ERA before the time expired, leaving the amendment three states short. Our ERA campaign got financial and other support from the ACLU Women’s Rights Project in New York, still headed by Ruth Bader Ginsburg.

In 1980, Ruth was appointed by President Carter to the federal Court of Appeals, joining the District of Columbia Circuit.

In 1982, I joined the faculty of the UC Davis Law School.

Justice Ginsburg took her seat on the U.S. Supreme Court in 1993.

In 1994, I received an invitation from Professor Herma Hill Kay, then dean of the UC Berkeley Law School, to join her as co-author of the law school textbook, Sex-Based Discrimination. Herma had been producing new editions by herself ever since Ruth had gone on the federal bench in 1980, but Ruth had been urging her for some time to get help. At some point, Ruth sent me a note, thanking me for agreeing to be Herma’s co-author. Herma and I published three more editions of the textbook over the next 12 years.

In 1996, Justice Ginsburg authored the Supreme Court opinion in U.S. v. Virginia, finding that the exclusion of women from the Virginia Military Institute, a public university, violated the Equal Protection Clause. She relied on all those cases she had litigated in the 1970s overturning sex-based classifications and got as close as she could to “strict scrutiny” of a “suspect class.” She labeled the level of judicial review as “skeptical scrutiny” for sex-based classifications. Five other justices joined her majority opinion.

In 2006, I was in Washington, D.C. on sabbatical. I called up Justice Ginsburg’s office and asked if I could sit in on a couple of oral arguments. I got to sit in the “family” section of the chambers, in Marty Ginsburg’s seat, and after the first set of oral arguments, the guard escorted me up to Justice Ginsburg’s office. We had a very pleasant fifteen-minute conversation. That was the last time I saw Justice Ginsburg.

I retired from the law school in 2007, and retired from teaching Gender and Law in Women’s Studies in 2012.

But, of course, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg never retired.

In the 1970s, Ruth Bader Ginsburg was responsible for developing the law of constitutional Equal Protection which has benefited all of us ever since. We owe her our deepest gratitude.

October 22, 2019

What the gun lobby gets wrong about the 2nd Amendment

[Cross-posted from the Los Angeles Times]

By Vikram D. Amar and Alan E. Brownstein

The Supreme Court will hear a gun control case in December that could significantly limit the ability of state and local governments to regulate guns for public safety reasons.

The case involves a New York City regulation on transporting handguns that was repealed in July. Although that original rule is no longer in effect, for now the court has not determined the matter to be moot, so the case will move forward.

In this dispute and others, opposition to gun regulations is often grounded on the premise that once an individual interest is identified as a “fundamental” right, that interest prevails over all countervailing public concerns.

That premise is profoundly mistaken. And, importantly, it is inconsistent with the way that constitutional doctrine has developed with other fundamental rights, such as freedom of speech and freedom of religion. Second Amendment rights should be treated no more favorably, despite the political rhetoric of gun rights supporters who claim that any firearm regulation is an unconstitutional infringement on their rights.

Of course, a constitutional right does carry with it a strong presumption against government interference with that particular activity, even though the exercise of the right involves a societal cost. We protect freedom of religion, for example, even though we know that some religious practices — like pulling children out of school after the eighth grade — might be considered problematic or harmful.

But there is a critical difference between assigning a high value to a constitutional right when balancing it against social concerns, and arguing that the right necessarily overrides the public’s ability to regulate that activity in ways that may be needed to protect the community.

The doctrine surrounding freedom of speech is instructive. No one doubts that speech rights are taken seriously in America. Yet the right to free speech is not absolute and can be regulated in numerous circumstances. Courts subject government regulations that affect speech to different standards of review that balance the public’s interest against the individual’s liberty. Among factors considered are the kind of speech involved and the location and manner of the restriction.

For example, a ban on rallies on public streets in residential neighborhoods after 9 p.m. would likely be upheld even though it burdens speech, so long as the law did not discriminate based on the message rally speakers expressed.

So too with protections for personal privacy under the 4th Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. That amendment doesn’t bar all searches and seizures, but instead requires that such intrusions be “reasonable,” a concept that inherently involves some kind of balancing of interests. Hence, we all must endure airport security screening searches because they are a reasonable means to protect air travel safety.

The individual right to bear arms for self-defense, as announced by the Supreme Court in 2008, is likewise not unlimited. Even though the court in that case struck down a flat ban on possession of handguns that might be used for self-defense in people’s homes, it observed that states could — for historical and public-policy safety reasons — prohibit people with felony convictions or people with mental illness from possessing guns, demonstrating that the very scope of the 2nd Amendment’s protection takes account of countervailing public objectives. For instance, some states require that gun owners keep their firearms locked up if there are children living in the home, even though gun owners might prefer easier access to firearms for self-defense.

Or consider the contours of self-defense itself. A 2nd Amendment right to keep guns for self-defense does not eliminate the need for society to think about how guns should be responsibly employed, even in self-defense situations. If someone uses a gun purportedly for self-defense purposes and kills another person, the 2nd Amendment does not preclude an evaluation of whether the alleged threat was sufficient to justify the use of deadly force or whether the killing involved excessive force because reasonable non-lethal alternatives were available for the shooter to defend himself.

The national debate now has focused on proposed regulations such as background checks and assault weapons bans. Whether specific measures would be permissible under the Constitution depends on their particulars, but the big point is that particulars matter.

In evaluating gun control regulations, it’s legitimate to take into account the social harms and risks arising from individuals keeping, bearing and using firearms. Constitutional analysis of the 2nd Amendment, as with other fundamental rights, requires some kind of balancing of interests, which includes considering the state’s need to promote public safety.

Vikram D. Amar is dean and professor of law at the University of Illinois College of Law. Alan E. Brownstein is professor emeritus at the UC Davis School of Law.

September 10, 2018

Originalism is at war with America

By Alan Brownstein

[Cross-posted from The Hill]

President Trump is nominating federal judges, and Supreme Court Justices such as Judge Brett Kavanaugh, who claim to be committed to “originalism.” This approach to constitutional law requires that the Constitution be interpreted to mean today what the text was intended or understood to mean at the time it was written. But originalism conflicts sharply with American reality and American ideals.  

Years ago, Frank Sinatra sang a song about what America meant to him. The last line was “But especially the people, that’s America to me.” If that’s what America is, then originalism is unamerican.  Because there is no place for the over 300 million Americans today in originalist interpretations of constitutional law. We just don’t count.

Who does count? Only the people who were here in the 1780’s and 90’s or when specific constitutional amendments were adopted. The vast new diversity of the American people today has nothing to offer to our political foundations. 

Both originalists and non-originalists look to American history to interpret the Constitution. But to originalists, most of that history stops 230 years ago. The American constitutional story largely begins and ends on the first page. To non-originalists, American constitutional law, like America itself, is a story that never ends.

The key issue separating originalists and non-originalists is what to do with all of the rest of American history after the Constitution was ratified. When courts interpret the Constitution, just how much weight should be assigned to the collective experience of the American people over the last 230 years. The originalist answer is none or as little as possible. What matters most is what judges decide constitutional language meant over two centuries ago.

Put bluntly, this originalist commitment to a constitution frozen in time and divorced from the changes America has undergone over the centuries repudiates the core values of the American experience.

Think about what is distinctive and special about America. European governments were chained to centuries of history and tradition. That was the old world. America is the new world. We are the pragmatists, the experimenters. We try things out and continue what works and discard what doesn’t. We do that with everything including law. But that’s not the America of originalists. From their perspective, constitutional law is fixed and immutable. It cannot evolve. Judges cannot learn from American experience.

Non-originalists believe that the American people have worked with constitutional law for over two centuries. We learned a lot. We struggled to create constitutional doctrine that reflects who we actually are as a people, not some ideologically manipulated picture of who a few judges think we once were.

Unlike originalists, non-originalists recognize that the Constitution must take account of the changed understanding in our society of the status and rights of women. Accordingly, privacy and autonomy rights including the right to access to medical contraceptives must be protected and gender discriminatory laws must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny.

Unlike originalists, non-originalists understand how much our society has learned over time about the LGBT community. Because they are no longer in hiding in response to persecution, we can now see our gay and lesbian family members, friends, neighbors, co-congregants, and colleagues as people with the same needs and rights as the rest of us. At the constitutional level, this means that laws criminalizing sodomy or prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying must be struck down.

Unlike originalists, non-originalists have learned that democracy needs constitutional protection against political threats the framers may have under-estimated or ignored. Courts cannot close their eyes to elections being manipulated through burdens on voting and gerrymandered districts. The Constitution must be interpreted to protect voting as a fundamental right and to insist, at a minimum, that election districts must be of equal size and reflect the principle of one person, one vote.

Put simply, non-originalists believe that constitutional case law is a process grounded in the on-going experience of the American people. Older decisions can be challenged because of their real world consequences. Non-originalist judges may make mistakes. When that happens, eventually the wrongfully decided cases are overruled. Constitutional law does not become permanent unless it works, unless it resonates with the beliefs of the American people overtime.

Originalists believe that history has an iron grip on constitutional meaning. The great constitutional questions of the day turn on lawyers debating what people understood centuries ago, not on the needs of Americans today and the values we have forged over centuries of struggle.

Alan Brownstein is a professor of law emeritus at the University of California, Davis School of Law. He has written numerous articles for academic journals and opinion pieces for other media on a range of constitutional law subjects. He is a member of the American Law Institute and serves on the Legal Committee of the Northern California American Civil Liberties Union. He received his B.A. degree from Antioch College and earned his J.D. (magna cum laude) from Harvard Law School, where he served as a Case Editor of the Harvard Law Review.



January 24, 2018

14th Annual Water Law Symposium: “The Future of California’s Water Infrastructure”

By Richard Frank

On Saturday, January 20th, I had the opportunity to accompany a number of King Hall water law students to the 14th Annual Water Law Symposium, held this year at UC Berkeley. The symposium is an extraordinary collaboration among six different Northern California law schools--including King Hall. Remarkably, this annual event is wholly student-organized and -produced, and recently won an American Bar Association award as the best law student-organized event in the nation. It's also become California's premier water law conference.

The theme of this year's symposium was "The Future of California's Water Infrastructure"--a most timely topic given the 2017 failure of the Oroville Dam and other water-related infrastructure challenges. King Hall's contribution to the symposium took the form of organizing and presenting a panel on "The Challenges of an Evolving Climate: A Case Study of the Impacts of Wildfire on California's Water Infrastructure."

Special kudos to King Hall water law student Ellen Simmons '19, one of the organizers of the UC Davis panel at the Symposium. When one of the panelists was forced to cancel at the last minute due to a personal emergency, Ellen stepped up, assumed the panel moderator's role and performed flawlessly in that capacity. Similarly, King Hall faculty colleague Camille Pannu, Director of the Water Justice Clinic, graciously did double duty at the symposium: in addition to speaking on the King Hall-organized panel with Ellen, Professor Pannu pinch-hit for a UCLA Law School colleague who was unable to travel to UC Berkeley due to the Montecito mudslides and subsequent closure of Highway 101.



December 12, 2017

UC Davis School of Law, Jindal Global Law School Hold Joint Conference

From left to right: Professor Afra Afsharipour, Professor Angela Harris, and Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat.

UC Davis School of Law and Jindal Global Law School hosted a joint conference on "Law, Institutions, and Justice: Understanding the Roles and Responsibilities of 'Public' and 'Private' Institutions in Policymaking and Governance" at Jindal Global Law School on December 2 in Sonipat, India.

This was the first in a series of interdisciplinary conferences bringing together scholars from the U.S. and India to engage in explorations of issues related to democratic institutions and the quest to ensure social, economic, and political justice. The second decade of the 21st century has brought challenges to the three pillars of liberalism - institutions, integrity, and rights. The conference created a scholarly conversation about these challenges and how best to respond to them.

UC Davis School of Law presenters included Professors Afra Afsharipour, Angela Harris, Ashutosh Bhagwat, and Peter Lee. Jindal Global Law School Professors Avirup Bose and Suvrajyoti Gupta also made presentations, as did a number of other distinguished Jindal Global University scholars.

The conference was part of a partnership between Jindal Global Law School and UC Davis that was formed almost five years ago. In addition to faculty and student exchanges, the law schools have plans for additional academic forums on timely legal issues featuring cross-disciplinary perspectives.

"We are honored to work with our distinguished Jindal Global University colleagues to explore timely issues, and we are especially excited about the deepening relationship between UC Davis School of Law and Jindal Global Law School as we expand our portfolio of partnership activities," said Beth Greenwood, Associate Dean for International Programs at UC Davis School of Law. "This visit, led by Professor Afsharipour, presented an opportunity to plan future joint interdisciplinary conferences and other innovative initiatives. We would especially like to thank our Jindal Global Law School colleagues and Vice Chancellor Dr. Raj Kumar and Dean Kevin Johnson for making this joint conference possible."

For further information, please contact Concha Romero at or at 530-752-9043.

From left to right: Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat, Professor Afra Afsharipour, and Professor Angela Harris.

From left to right: Professor Peter Lee, Jindal Global Law School Vice Chancellor Dr. Raj Kumar, Professor Angela Harris, Professor Afra Afsharipour, and Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat.



November 30, 2017

New Casebook by Hing, Chacón, and Johnson: Immigration Law and Social Justice

[Cross-posted from Immigration Prof Blog.]

We are happy to announce the publication of our new casebook: Immigration Law and Social Justice, published by Wolters Kluwer, Aspen Publishers.

We are presenting this casebook on immigration law and policy from a social justice perspective. We believe that most law students interested in taking a course on immigration law have a social justice/public interest motivation. We think you are interested in representing immigrants facing deportation or who may fear deportation to their home country for social, economic, or political reasons. You also likely have a strong interest in the public policy debate over immigration visa reform, enforcement, or legalization because of the injustices you sense in current policies. Many instructors who teach immigration law (regular faculty members and adjunct professors) also come from a pro-immigrant perspective that regards the practice of immigration law squarely within social justice/public interest practice. We hope this casebook provides materials and a format that will enhance the classroom experience for students and instructors who approach the topic from that perspective.

The content and organization (outlined in the table of contents) is broad and contains new topics such as detention, public interest/rebellious lawyering theories, lessons for public interest lawyers, and background on migration, globalization, criminalization, and racialization of immigration law. Our goal is to inspire our public interest students, while providing a solid way to analyze immigration law through a political and social lens and the foundation to practice effectively. Our pedagogy combines standard cases, but also stories of the lives of immigrants, transcripts, training manuals, academic articles, news articles, and other tools that social justice lawyers use. Our rationale in editing cases is to hone in on the parts of the cases that are necessary for an understanding of the court's rationale and some aspects of important dissenting opinions.

We know that most of you come to the course already inspired to do good, socially-inspired work. Much of what has evolved within the world of U.S. immigration law and policy will disappoint and leave you upset. But hopefully, we have asked the right questions and pointed in particular directions that can help us takes some steps forward in achieving justice for immigrants, refugees, and their families.

You can download a detailed outline of the book's contents and the introductory chapter here.

The book can be ordered here.

Thank you.

Bill Ong Hing, Professor of Law and Migration Studies, University of San Francisco
Jennifer M. Chacón, Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine
Kevin R. Johnson, Dean and Mabie-Apallas Professor of Public Interest Law and
Chicana/o Studies, University of California, Davis