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August 1, 2013

Why California Should Repeal Proposition 8

Part Two in a Two-Part Series on What Should Happen to Same-Sex Marriage in California After Hollingsworth v. Perry. Cross-posted from Justia's Verdict.

In the space below, I continue to analyze what will-and what should-happen to California's voter-adopted ban on same-sex marriage, Proposition 8, in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling earlier this summer in Hollingsworth v. Perry.  Two weeks ago, in Part One of this two-part series, I argued that the request made on July 11 by the proponents of Proposition 8 to get the California Supreme Court to order County Clerks to stop granting same-sex marriage licenses-Clerks have been issuing same-sex licenses for about a month-was unlikely to be successful.  Today, after elaborating a bit more on this post-Perry litigation, I move beyond the judicial arena to the ballot box, where I think repeal of Proposition 8 by the California electorate is feasible.

A Recent Development:  The San Diego County Clerk Asks the California Supreme Court to Weigh In

Shortly after my last column was posted, the County Clerk for San Diego County filed a separate request in the California Supreme Court asking for an order declaring that Proposition 8 should continue to be enforced by County Clerks, and preventing the Governor, the Attorney General, and the State Registrar from trying to force the San Diego Clerk to issue same-sex marriage licenses.  The San Diego Clerk's arguments echoed those made to the California Supreme Court by the initiative's proponents themselves the week before.  As it did with the proponents' request, the court refused to grant the San Diego Clerk an immediate block on same-sex marriage license issuance, but set a briefing schedule so that the court could decide whether to fully address the merits of the dispute in the coming month(s).

I don't expect the California Justices to accept the San Diego County Clerk's invitation to wade into this dispute in depth, for many of the same reasons that I discussed in Part One in connection with the proponents' request:  (1) The California Supreme Court's review is discretionary; (2) The case turns largely on the best way to interpret a federal district court order, and state courts will usually refrain from getting into contested interpretations of federal court orders; (3) The federal court order, by its straightforward terms, applies broadly to the County Clerks in Los Angeles and Alameda, so that unless those two individuals challenge the federal court order, same-sex marriage licenses will continue to issue from those Counties (and thus in the State) in any event; and (4)  Even if the state law questions-about the independence of County Clerks from the Governor or State Registrar and the obligation to continue to enforce laws that have not yet been invalidated by appellate courts-are interesting and important, there will be better cases down the road in which to reach those issues.

And here's an additional reason why the San Diego Clerk's request will likely be rejected by the California Supremes:  unlike the Proposition 8 proponents, the San Diego Clerk (who is arguably subject to the federal court order) might have standing in federal court to seek a ruling-from that court itself-that he is not covered by the federal order and will not be held in federal contempt if he refuses to issue same-sex marriage licenses.  A federal court faced with such a such a case might, at that point, try to enlist the help of the California Supreme Court to answer the question whether County Clerks are subject to the "control or supervision" (the term used in the federal court order) of state-level officials.  But the California Supreme Court would seem well-advised to wait for such a request (if one ever materialized) before opining on these matters.

Moving from the Courtroom to the Ballot Box:  Repeal of a Measure No Longer Supported by the People

Based on the analysis offered above, I don't expect the issuance of same-sex marriage licenses in California to stop anytime soon.  And so, for practical purposes at least, California's ban on same-sex marriage will become a dead letter.  Is that where the Proposition 8 political-legal opera should end?  To my mind, the answer is no; I think Proposition 8's true final Act should be repeal at the ballot box.

If Proposition 8 is not, in practice, limiting gay marriage, why would repeal be necessary or helpful?  For starters, we must remember that a judicial invalidation of a law and an injunction against its enforcement aren't the same as getting rid of the law; the measure remains on the books, and conceivably could spring back to life if a different Governor or Attorney General tried to reopen the case and undo the federal court injunction by defending Proposition 8 on the merits (something Governors Schwarzenegger and Brown, and Attorneys General Brown and Harris, never did.)  Cases (like Perry) that were never actually contested on the merits between the appropriate plaintiffs and defendants are-because of the absence of a true adversarial clash in the courtroom resulting in a judgment-strong candidates for reopening, should a particular Governor or Attorney General want to do so.

But, someone might respond, the political climate in California is moving in the opposite direction-in favor of, not against, same-sex marriage.  So the likelihood of a new Governor or Attorney General trying to resurrect Proposition 8-especially after hundreds of thousands of same-sex couples in the state already get married-is very slim.  I think that's probably true.  But remember that Governors and Attorney Generals get elected based on many issues, and they may win office in spite of, rather than because of, their position on any one subject.  Moreover, after they assume office, they sometimes take actions that seem to go against the views of a majority of voters, as Schwarzenegger and Brown themselves did when they refused to defend Proposition 8 when the Perry lawsuit was filed in 2009, a time when the state's electorate may very well still have favored the measure.

But all that brings me to the second, and more important, reason to repeal Proposition 8:  It no longer reflects the views of Californians, and state law on fundamental questions like this ought to accord with the true beliefs of state voters.  Proposition 8 passed in 2008 by a 52-48 margin, and a recent LATimes opinion poll suggests that a similar measure today would be supported by only 38% of voters, with 56% favoring same-sex marriage equality-a huge change in just five years.  But the only poll with true credibility is the one at the ballot box itself, and so Californians should revisit Proposition 8 in an election the next year or so.

And having California's laws line up with California's values will matter to people outside California as well.  As is now clear, after the Supreme Court's actions earlier this summer, the struggle over same-sex marriage rights in the United States continues to be waged in many, if not most, of the 35 or so states that do not allow same-sex marriage.  Having California in the "yes" column on same-sex marriage as a result of an election, rather than as the product of the actions of a small number of persons (a Governor and Attorney General who declined to defend, and an unelected District Court judge who issued an injunction), is important for political purposes in other states and, ultimately, for constitutional purposes when the U.S. Supreme Court returns to same-sex marriage rights-as it will almost certainly have to-in the coming years.  In Perry and United States v. Windsor (the case involving the federal Defense of Marriage Act, also known as DOMA) a month ago, the Court was able to avoid the question whether there is a national constitutional right to same-sex marriage, but it will have to answer that question directly in the next decade or so.  And there is broad agreement that the Court is keenly aware of national consensuses and national trends when it decides the content and scope of national constitutional rights (whether or not such awareness ought to be relevant).  Having California (which alone houses about 12% of all Americans) join the ranks of the same-sex marriage states through an affirmative act of its electorate will maximize its clout in these national processes.

The Logistics of Repeal:  Getting a Repeal Measure on the Ballot

Many measures that (like a repeal of Proposition 8) stand a good chance of success before the voters are nonetheless never acted upon because of the cost (often about a few million dollars) and headache of gathering the signatures required to qualify an initiative for California's statewide ballot.  But signature-gathering isn't the only way to get a measure on the ballot in California; if 2/3 of each house of the state legislature votes to put a constitutional amendment on the ballot, the amendment is offered to the electorate.  For decades this route has seemed an unlikely one, because major ballot measures are often very polarizing along party lines, and neither political party has controlled 2/3 of each house of the legislature.  But today (and barring any very unusual events, for the next year at least) Democrats can be assured of occupying 2/3 of the seats of the California Assembly and Senate.  And there may very well be a number of Republican legislators who think that California voters should be given the chance to weigh in again on same-sex marriage, since the landscape has changed so much over the last half-decade.  So there seems to be a window for the California legislature to act, to let California voters speak once again on this most important of questions.  And even though some significant money may have to be spent in the ad campaign to get such a repeal enacted, I would expect-given the salience of this topic in California over the last few years and the movement reflected in recent opinion polls-the amount of money need not be that great, and in any event would be well-spent, given the alternative: months and perhaps years of technical wrangling in the state and federal courts, leading to an outcome that cannot easily to be said to derive from the California people themselves.

July 1, 2013

SB 744: Border Enforcement Run Amok? by Kevin R. Johnson

(Cross-posted from ImmigrationProf)

The passage of the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act (Senate Bill 744) by the U.S. Senate is a major achievement. It includes provisions that would increase border enforcement, expand legal immigration, and create a path to legalization for eligible undocumented immigrants.

As with all political compromises, SB 744 will not please everyone. Still, the reform proposal will in my estimation could well turn out to be the first major piece of truly "comprehensive" immigration reform since President Ronald Reagan signed the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 into law.

The new border enforcement measures in SB 744 build on previous enforcement measures, such as the expansion of the border fence along the U.S./Mexico border. More generally, the U.S. government has greatly ramped up border enforcement since the mid-1990s, for example, with the high profile border operation known as Operation Gatekeeper sought to seal the border immediately south of San Diego.

This post focuses on one troublesome aspect of the Senate bill. The "border security" aspects, including the amendment sponsored by Republican Senators Bob Corker and John Hoeven added immediately before its passage in the Senate, are deeply problematic. The "border surge" amendment dramatically increases unnecessary enforcement, adding thousands of Border Patrol officers along the U.S./Mexico border and billions of dollars into further militarizing the entire region. In my view, the border surge would not reduce undocumented migration and thus constitutes a big waste of money and resources. To add insult to injury, the surge would also exacerbate some of the worst excesses of the current enforcement regime.

Why More Enforcement?

The border enforcement provisions of SB 744, including the requirement that all employers verify employee eligibility to lawfully work through the computer database known as E-Verify, are a response to the claim that the Obama administration is failing to enforce the immigration laws. This is a difficult claim to substantiate based on the facts:

1. Record Deportations: The Obama administration has deported more noncitizens than any administration in U.S. history, setting annual removal records of about 400,000 a year.

2. Super-Aggressive Enforcement: The Obama administration has taken aggressive positions toward immigration enforcement, such as the Secure Communities program , which has allowed for record levels of removals and aggressive litigation positions, such as in Moncrieffe v. Holder, a case in which the Supreme Court rejected the U.S. government's efforts to classify a long term lawful permanent resident as an "aggravated felon" subject to mandatory removal based on one conviction for possession of the equivalent of 2-3 marijuana cigarettes.

3. Decreased Undocumented Immigration: Undocumented immigration has decreased due to the Great Recession and many Mexicans have returned to Mexico.

 

The Questionable Policy Impact of Increased Border Enforcement

The border enforcement measures of the Senate reform bill would do little to reduce undocumented immigration. While the requirement of the use of E-Verify by employers might diminish the magnet of jobs (although concerns abound that the database will be accurate or will wrongfully deny employment opportunities to many people eligible to work), other enforcement measures will not have do much to deter undocumented immigration. The stagnant U.S. economy has dramatically reduced undocumented immigration. Moreover, the border surge amendment has caused some pro-immigrant groups to oppose the immigration bill. To make matters worse, the various enforcement measures would continue some of the worst excesses along the border:

1. Destruction of Families: The removal of 400,000 noncitizens a year, many for relatively minor criminal offenses, has torn apart hundreds of thousands of families and communities across the country. U.S. citizen spouses and children have suffered as well as the noncitizens removed. This destruction of families is inconsistent with the goal of promoting family unity that long has been the linchpin of the U.S. immigration laws.

2. Racial Profiling: U.S. immigration enforcement long has been plagued by racial profiling of Latinos. By greatly expanding border enforcement and the number of Border Patrol officers, the bill will necessary expand racial profiling of Latinos, who are perpetually suspected of being foreigners. Profiling arguably has increased with increased state and local law enforcement involvement in immigration enforcement. Notably, a federal court in May 2013 ruled that Sheriff Joe Arpaio and his Maricopa County (Arizona) Sheriff's Office engaged in a pattern and practice of abusing the civil rights of Latinos in the name of immigration enforcement.

3. Border Deaths: One less well-known aspect of increased border enforcement has been the growing death toll along the U.S./Mexico border region. As enforcement has centered on major urban areas along the border, migrants have sought entry in more desolate locations where death due to exposure (i.e., heat in the desert) is more likely. Deaths on the border are a regular part of live in the border region. More enforcement, including extension of the border fence, will likely contribute to more deaths as migrants are redirected toward more desolate - and dangerous - locations.

Conclusion

Many observers see the border enforcement provisions of comprehensive immigration reform as a political compromise necessary to attract votes, especially from Republicans in the House of Representatives. That may be true. However, there is little, if any, reason to believe that the measures will in fact reduce undocumented immigration. And there is every reason to believe that the enhanced border enforcement will have negative impacts on Latina/os and other Americans, tearing apart American families, increasing racial profiling and discrimination, and resulting in more deaths along the U.S./Mexico border. Conmsequently, we should view the political compromise with those significant costs in mind.

Where does this analysis leave us? There are other parts of SB 744 that do make more policy sense, such as many of the changes to the legal immigration provisions (e.g., increasing the visas for high- and low-skilled workers, abolition of the diversity visa program, elimination of the long visa backlogs, etc.), and the path to legalization for eligible undocumented immigrants, including the DREAMers who were brought to this country as children by their parents. The enforcement provisions do not help the bill achieve the policy goals of immigration reform. Moreover, the decision to double down on border enforcement will result in horrible collateral damages. It ultimately is a legitimate question whether the costs of the enforcement measures outweigh the benefits of the more positive policy aspects of the Senate bill. we also should keep in mind that the Senate bill may be as good as it gets.

June 26, 2013

In the Media: Faculty Members on Prop. 8 and DOMA (Updated)


Photo: Reuters

The national, regional, and local media are turning to UC Davis law faculty for expert analysis and commentary on today's U.S. Supreme Court decisions on the Proposition 8 and Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) same-sex marriage cases.

Here is a sampling of media citations. This list will be updated as more stories hit the web.

 

Dean Kevin R. Johnson

Southern California Public Radio

DOMA ruling a victory for bi-national couples, but legal questions remain

http://www.scpr.org/blogs/multiamerican/2013/06/26/14103/doma-ruling-a-victory-for-bi-national-couples-but/

 

Associate Dean and Professor of Law Vikram Amar

CNBC-TV

Supreme Court Strikes Down DOMA; Paves Way for California Gay Marriage

http://www.cnbc.com/id/100845753 (with video)

 

Justia’s Verdict

Analysis: If the Supreme Court Decides the Proposition 8 Sponsors Lack Standing, What Will Happen to Same-Sex Marriage in California? This April 26 essay is being cited by numerous news agencies and blogs today.

http://verdict.justia.com/2013/04/26/if-the-supreme-court-decides-the-proposition-8-sponsors-lack-standing

 

KQED Forum

Prop 8 Ruling Paves Way for Same-Sex Marriage in Calif.; DOMA Ruling Gives Gay Couples Federal Benefits

http://blogs.kqed.org/newsfix/2013/06/25/proposition-8-supreme-court/ (with audio)

 

The Sacramento Bee

Jerry Brown tells California counties to issue gay marriage licenses

http://blogs.sacbee.com/capitolalertlatest/2013/06/jerry-brown-tells-california-counties-to-issue-gay-marriage-licenses.html

 

The Los Angeles Times -- Update added June 27

Same Sex Weddings to Resume in California Soon, Officials Say

http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-gay-marriage-california-20130627,0,3679293.story

 

Capital Public Radio’s “Insight” -- Update added June 27

Prop. 8 and DOMA Follow-Up

http://www.capradio.org/news/insight/2013/06/13/insight-062713/ (with audio)

 

San Jose Mercury News -- Update added June 27

Proposition 8 Appears Doomed in California after Supreme Court Ruling

http://www.mercurynews.com/samesexmarriage/ci_23547428/gay-marriage-u-s-supreme-court-proposition-8

 

KTXL Fox40 News -- Update added June 27

Making Sense of What's Next after Ruling on Prop. 8

http://fox40.com/2013/06/26/making-sense-of-whats-next-after-ruling-on-prop-8/ (with video)

 

The Guardian UK -- Update added June 27

U.S. Moves to End DOMA Discrimination after Gay Rights Breakthrough

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/27/us-discrimination-gay-rights-doma

 

The New York Times -- Update added June 28

Roberts Pulls the Supreme Court to the Right Step by Step

www.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/us/politics/roberts-plays-a-long-game.html

 

The Los Angeles Times -- Update added June 28

Prop. 8 Ruling Raises Fears about Effects on Other Initiatives

http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-gay-marriage-initiatives-20130628,0,3117108.story

 

Professor of Law Courtney G. Joslin

Bloomberg News and Bloomberg Businessweek

Supreme Court Ruling Narrows Gay Couples’ Benefit Gap

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-26/supreme-court-ruling-narrows-gay-couples-benefit-gap.html

http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-06-26/supreme-court-ruling-narrows-benefit-gap-for-gay-couples-taxes

 

Capital Public Radio’s “Insight”

SCOTUS Rulings on DOMA & Prop. 8

http://www.capradio.org/news/insight/2013/06/26/insight-062613/ (with audio)

 

Equality Radio

Live Coverage: SCOTUS decisions on Prop 8 and DOMA

http://equalityradio.net/scotus-decisions/#.UctNaJzgf6A (with audio)

 

KTXL Fox40 Morning News

Reaction to the Prop 8 Ruling

http://fox40.com/2013/06/26/reaction-to-the-prop-8-ruling/ (with video)

 

Orange County Register -- Update added June 27

Why DOMA Went Down

Orange County Register DOMA Reactions.pdf (622.87 kb)

 

St. Louis Post Dispatch -- Update added June 27

Many Applaud Gay Marriage Rulings, thought Direct Effect in Missouri and Illinois Will Be Limited

http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/bells-ring-downtown-as-local-community-responds-to-supreme-court/article_7630497d-4f75-5006-9720-5f6946c6b5b2.html

June 21, 2013

A Preview of Next Week’s Supreme Court Ruling in Hollingsworth v. Perry: What to Expect and What to Look For

Cross posted from Justia's Verdict.

As millions of people eagerly await next week's Supreme Court action in Hollingsworth v. Perry, the case from California involving Proposition 8 (the voter-enacted ban on same-sex marriages in the Golden State), I offer below a few thoughts on what to expect and what to look for in the Court's ruling.

We Should Not Expect a Definitive Resolution of the Federal Constitutional Question of Same-Sex Marriage

First, I don't think we will get a big resolution of the meta-question whether the federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment requires recognition of same-sex marriage.  Why?  Because a ruling in either direction is fraught with peril.  The Court (or at least its middle, controlling wing) is probably not ready to proclaim a national right when roughly three-quarters (38) of the States currently do not recognize same-sex marriages.  At the time of Loving v. Virginia, the 1967 case striking down Virginia's ban on interracial marriage, only 16 (or less than one-third) of the States prohibited marriage across races.  And in Lawrence v. Texas, the case from a decade ago in which a divided Court invalidated Texas' attempt to criminally punish someone for engaging in homosexual conduct, the Court noted that only a handful of states at that time actively prosecuted persons for similar conduct.  Even the momentous equality ruling Brown v. Board of Education did not call into question the laws of more than 20 or so states that mandated educational segregation in 1954.  As bold as the Supreme Court has been in protecting liberty and equality rights, past practice does not suggest a likely proclamation of a national right here, when things are so fluid in the States.

But that fluidity also cuts against a ruling flatly rejecting a national right to same-sex marriage.  Because things are changing so quickly (witness the three states that have decided to legalize same-sex marriage just in the few months since the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the Proposition 8 dispute), the number of states embracing gay marriage could increase over the next decade from 12 to something in the range of 30 or more.  So the Court (or, again, its middle wing) may not want to deny a same-sex marriage right claim altogether next week, because to do so would make it harder (on account of stare decisis) for the Court to recognize a national right in the coming years, should a majority of Justices think doing so is the correct constitutional thing.

In short, my sense has always been that the Court had no desire to wade into the same-sex marriage thicket while the issue is percolating so actively in legislatures and state courts, and that the only reason the Court granted review in the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and Proposition 8 cases this year is that lower federal courts invalidated these prominent enactments.  (That is to say, had lower courts upheld DOMA and Proposition 8, I think the Justices would have been content to deny review.)  Having been essentially forced to take cases before the Justices really wanted to weigh in at all, the Court will, I think, try to resolve less, rather than more.  In the DOMA case, there seemed at oral argument to be some support among the Justices to invalidate the challenged provision of DOMA without imposing same-sex marriage on unwilling states (by relying to some extent on federalism rather than individual rights), and I think in the Proposition 8 case the Court will also look to act as minimally as reasonably possible.

Narrower Options in the Proposition 8 Case

So what are the remaining options for the Court concerning Proposition 8, and which ones are the most likely?  One is that the Court could reject the plaintiffs' assertion of a national right to gay marriage, but make clear that things could change as the nation evolves on this question.  This is a possible route, but not a very attractive one for the middle/left of the Court, because the takeaway headline/holding would still be the rejection of the right.  And this would-if the Court were then to want to reverse course and accept the right in the near-term future-require the Court to offer a somewhat contentious explanation of how the meaning of the Constitutional document can change so rapidly.  Easier-for those Justices who think they may embrace the claim down the road-to avoid the broad question altogether for now.

A second option would be to strike down Proposition 8, but do so on the narrow grounds used by the Ninth Circuit and urged by the Solicitor General, grounds that would not invalidate the laws of all 37 other non-same-sex-marriage states, but rather only some small number of them.   The problem is that the Ninth Circuit's reasoning-which included the idea that California's ban is hard to justify as rational because the state has gone so far down the road to equalizing the rights of gay and straight couples-doesn't really work.  Many of the Justices at oral argument-even those generally thought to be more liberal or moderate-made the point that telling a State that it can't be rational in moving incrementally simply because it has moved at all is odd, at the very least.  The argument is a tough sell, even though the Ninth Circuit bought it.

A third choice would be to simply dismiss the Proposition 8 case from the Court's docket altogether.  Such a dismissal (known as a "DIG", which is short for "Dismiss as Improvidently Granted") is certainly possible, and would enable the Court to say nothing at all about Proposition 8.  It would be as if the Court had declined to grant review in the first place.  But, as I've explained before, a DIG is hard to square with the decision of four Justices to grant certiorari in the first place; nothing in the case has really changed since the original grant.  Moreover, a DIG would leave the Ninth Circuit ruling-and its reasoning-intact as the law of the Western United States, something a large number of Justices may be uncomfortable about.  Also, if the Court were going to DIG the case, it might have announced that decision before now.  So I place the odds of a DIG at something below 50%.

The Standing Route

That brings us to an approach I have been arguing for years is the best way to go-a ruling that Proposition 8's sponsors lack standing in federal court to defend the initiative, even though the elected officials normally counted on to defend (the Attorney General and the Governor) have declined to do so.  I think this is the most likely of the various possible outcomes (perhaps more likely than all the others combined) because it has many virtues.

Such a ruling would allow the Court to avoid speaking to the merits of the same-sex marriage dispute, but would also erase the Ninth Circuit's opinion.  A ruling on standing would-in the end-most likely result in Proposition 8's demise.  But, importantly, under this scenario, same-sex marriage would likely come about in California not from unelected federal judges' contested views of the Constitution, but rather from the actions of elected (and accountable) officials in California (the Attorney General and Governor) whose failure to defend the measure will ultimately bring it down.

A standing ruling would more than just prudent; as I have argued, I think it would be justified by the principles of standing law itself, and would resolve an important and open question within the doctrine of standing.  So a ruling that the Proposition 8 proponents lack standing should be seen not an unprincipled dodge, but rather as a legally justified and eminently sensible course of action.

Things to Look for if the Court Rejects the Proponents' Standing

If the Court does pursue this avenue, here are the two things to look for/focus on:

First, as for same-sex marriage in California, we should examine the ruling carefully to see what guidance the Court gives to the lower courts on remand.  Everyone agrees that the Ninth Circuit opinion would be vacated (undone), and that the two named-plaintiff couples who sued should get their licenses.  But how and why they get their licenses will be important, and will affect whether other same-sex couples in the State should get licenses right away too, or instead will have to wait for future legal or political developments.  Key to this question will be what, if anything, the Court says about trial Judge Vaughn Walker's judgment striking down Proposition 8 that he issued after the high-profile trial he oversaw.  We are not talking here just about the scope of Judge Walker's injunctive remedy against State officials, but whether the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs itself has to be erased and re-sought (in a different form) by the plaintiffs.  I have argued that Judge Walker's judgment probably should be vacated (and language near the end of the Supreme Court's opinion in Karcher v. May seems to support my argument), but we need to see whether any, or a majority, of the Justices speak directly to this issue and what they say.  The issue will undoubtedly be important for the timing of same-sex marriage in California, but it also has ramifications for standing doctrine more generally.  The question of what, precisely, follows from a finding that the only defendant who is actively defending lacks standing is an important one.

Second, we should examine what, if anything, the Court says about how initiatives can be defended when elected officials don't defend them, so that the initiative device itself is not diminished.  The best argument for initiative-proponent standing is that elected officials shouldn't be able to kill the very initiative device that is designed to be a check on their power.  There are ways for the Court to ensure that initiatives can be defended even if the Proposition 8 proponents lack standing-e.g., voters can deputize initiative sponsors explicitly and provide a framework for their authority to represent the people  (in a way that Proposition 8 voters did not)-but the question is whether the Court will see and discuss them.

 

May 16, 2013

Book Review: Governing Immigration Through Crime

Cross-posted from Law and Politics Book Review.

The book is Governing Immigration Through Crime: A Reader.

Authors: Julie A. Dowling is Assistant Professor of Latina/Latino Studies at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. Jonathan Xavier Inda is Associate Professor of Latina/Latino Studies at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.

For several years, immigration scholars have criticized the increasing reliance on the criminal law (and criminal penalties) to enforce the U.S. immigration laws, which historically have been enforced through civil sanctions. Juliet Stumpf encapsulated the growing body of scholarly criticism in her seminal work “The Crimmigration Crisis,” a path-breaking article reprinted in Governing Immigration Through Crime.

The criminalization of U.S. immigration law has proceeded relatively quickly through a variety of steps. Congress in the last 25 years has systematically reformed the immigration laws so that increasing numbers of crimes can result in the removal of lawful permanent residents from the country. Exhibiting an Alice in Wonderland-like quality, the immigration laws today frequently classify misdemeanors as “aggravated felonies,” thus subjecting a lawful permanent resident to near-mandatory removal from the United States. The harshness of the removal grounds has led a conservative Supreme Court on several occasions to intervene; for example, the Court in 2013 halted the virtually mandatory removal of a long term resident of the United States guilty of possession of a few grams of marijuana for personal use (Moncrieffe v. Holder). Congress also has required the mandatory detention of the ever-expanding category of “criminal aliens,” which has created a huge, and growing, immigrant detention industry (McLeod 2012).

Beginning in earnest during the George W. Bush administration, U.S. immigration authorities have worked increasingly closely with state and local law enforcement authorities to remove noncitizens from the United States. The Obama administration has enlisted state and local police in efforts to enforce the U.S. immigration laws. Many states have passed immigration enforcement laws relying on the criminal law ostensibly designed to encourage undocumented immigrants to “self deport.” In addition to extension of an expensive fence along the U.S./Mexico border, U.S. immigration authorities have dramatically increased enforcement operations to levels never previously seen before in U.S. history. Last but not least, the crime of “illegal re-entry” into the United States has been prosecuted ever-aggressively by the U.S. government, contributing to docket congestion in the federal courts and a large increase in the number of Mexican nationals imprisoned in the United States.

The increased use of the criminal law to regulate immigration has had dramatic impacts. In President Obama’s first five [*209] years in office, his administration set records by removing roughly 400,000 immigrants from the United States annually; he has by a large margin deported more noncitizens than any President in U.S. history. It is noteworthy that removals have not been limited to undocumented immigrants but include many lawful permanent residents who have lived in the country for many years. Hundreds of thousands of removals have resulted in the destruction of hundreds of thousands of families, communities, and lives. Although the administration claims to focus on serious criminal offenders, many of those caught in the enforcement net are at best small time criminals, including persons arrested for traffic infractions such as lacking driver’s licenses for which undocumented immigrants are not eligible in most states.

Governing Immigration Through Crime collects in one reader important contributions to the scholarly literature on the use of the criminal law in immigration enforcement. The previously-published works were written by influential scholars from law and the social sciences, including anthropology, sociology, ethnic studies, criminology, urban planning, communication, and political science. The stated aim of this book “is to provide an interdisciplinary introduction to the governing of immigration through crime” (p.38). Fulfilling that aim, the editors’ selection and organization of the book results in a concise and thoughtful reader, with the pieces offering important perspectives from a variety of vantage points.

The volume begins with an extended introduction to “Governing Migrant Illegality” that sets the stage for the subsequent readings. The editors “broadly (but not exhaustively) map the governing of immigration through crime in the contemporary United States” (p.3, footnote omitted). As the editors state, “in the contemporary United States, undocumented immigration has come to be seen largely as a law and order issue” (p.5, footnote omitted). Much of the public and many political leaders characterize undocumented immigrants as social, economic, political, and national security threats to the nation. In response, the U.S. government has adopted an array of criminal measures to deter undocumented immigration, such as criminalization of immigration violations, increased enforcement (at the border and beyond), immigration raids, additional technology, detention and deportation, and more.

The introduction starts by briefly summarizing the much-publicized 2008 raid at a meat processing plant in rural Postville, Iowa in which most of the immigrant workers were charged criminally for identity theft. The focus on this incident indirectly demonstrates just how quickly immigration enforcement has changed in the last five years. Unlike the Bush administration, the Obama administration is not focusing its interior enforcement efforts on workplace raids. Rather, it has relied heavily on a new “Secure Communities” program, which requires state and local law enforcement agencies to share information about persons arrested with federal immigration authorities. In 2013, it is Secure Communities, not workplace raids, which results in the mass removals of “criminal aliens.”

Importantly, because of the disparate impacts of immigration enforcement on [*210] Latinos, Governing Immigration Through Crime conceptualizes “immigration enforcement as a form of racial governance” (p.18). These impacts can be seen most clearly at the U.S./Mexico border, with deaths of Mexican migrants resulting from border enforcement operations on a regular, predictable basis. Similarly, enforcement measures in the interior of the United States have had disparate impacts on Latinos, who represent approximately 75-80 percent of the persons annually deported from the United States.

Governing Immigration Through Crime recognizes that Latinos and immigrants have contested racialized immigration enforcement. In 2006, tens of thousands of people marched in the streets of cities across the United States in protest of – and ultimately defeated – a tough-as-nails immigration bill passed by the House of Representatives. Since them, undocumented college students known popularly as the DREAMers have pressed the nation for justice, eventually pushing the Obama administration to establish the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program.

The book is divided into five parts. Each part of the book has a short description of the chapters in that section.

Part I, “Law and Criminalization”, outlines in general terms the criminalization of U.S. immigration law. It includes chapters offering insights on Mexican migration to the United States (Nicholas DeGenova), the emergence of the “crimmigration crisis” (Juliet Stumpf), and the national security focus on migration since September 11, 2001 (Jennifer Chacón).

Part II, “Managing Borders”, has chapters on the physical and symbolic meanings of the growing U.S./Mexico “border wall” (Josiah McC. Heyman), the Minuteman Project’s vilification of Mexican migrants (Leo Chavez), and border-crossing deaths (Roxanne Lynn Doty). This part nicely links various enforcement measures, such as the border fence and the growing death toll of migrants in the U.S./Mexico border region.

Part III, “Policing the Interior”, includes chapters on the rise and fall of employer sanctions under U.S. immigration law (David Bacon and Bill Ong Hing), the human and civil rights impacts of Arizona’s immigration enforcement landmark S.B. 1070 (Rogelio Sáenz, Cecelia Menjívar, and San Juanita Edilia Garcia), and local immigration enforcement (including analysis of the passage of Hazleton, Pennsylvania’s much-publicized anti-immigrant ordinance) (Liette Gilbert). Added to the immigration laws in 1986, employer sanctions, which allow for the imposition of civil penalties on the employers of undocumented workers, has to this point failed to deter the employment of undocumented immigrants, thus contributing to political movements favoring state and local immigration enforcement measures.

Part IV, “Detention and Deportation”, includes chapters on the detention of Latinos as part and parcel of immigration enforcement (David Manuel Hernández), deportation and return to the United States of transnational Mexicans (Deborah A. Boehm), and the deportation of immigrants who had made the United States their true homes, aptly termed [*211] “exiled by law” by Susan Bibler Coutin.

Part V, “Immigrant Contestations”, includes chapters analyzing the mass immigration protests, or “La Gran Marcha”, of 2006 (Josue David Cisneros), the undocumented student movement (Robert G. Gonzales), and the use of surveillance strategies by groups seeking to ensure the protection of human rights and security (James P. Walsh).

The various chapters touch on the central issues raised by regulating immigration through deployment of the criminal laws. All of the chapters directly or indirectly criticize the use of the criminal law to regulate immigration to the United States. Their shared conclusion is that Governing Immigration Through Crime is a bad idea. Supporters of the current use of the criminal law to regulate immigration – and even its possible expansion – are not the intended audience of Governing Immigration Through Crime.

Space limitations necessarily require omissions in coverage. However, a few omissions deserve comment. The reader might have benefited from analysis of the most significant criminal immigration program currently in existence – the Obama administration’s Secure Communities program, which has culminated in more deportations than ever in U.S. history. Secure Communities requires state and local law enforcement to share information about persons arrested with U.S. immigration authorities. The program has generated considerable criticism from state and local law enforcement as well as immigrant rights’ advocates. It arguably undermines local law enforcement efforts to obtain the support of the immigrant community in ordinary law enforcement.

In addition, the chapter on Arizona’s S.B. 1070 would have benefitted – perhaps in a postscript, another chapter, or otherwise – from further analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. United States (2012). Although striking down three core provisions of S.B. 1070, the Court left intact the law’s most controversial provision, Section 2(B), which requires state and local police to assist in the enforcement of the U.S. immigration enforcement laws. Activists have voiced serious concerns that Section 2(B)’s implementation will result in increased racial profiling of Latinos – U.S. citizens, legal immigrants, and others – in law enforcement.

More generally, one might have thought that a volume on the use of the criminal law in immigration enforcement would have considered the day-to-day immigration enforcement, namely the widespread practice of racial profiling of Latinos. The Supreme Court in 1975 held that “Mexican appearance” could be one of many factors in an immigration stop, a holding that has resulted in the legal sanction of racial profiling in immigration enforcement (United States v. Brignoni-Ponce). Such profiling helps account for the disproportionate stops and arrests of Latinos for immigration (and other law enforcement) violations as well as disparate detention and removal rates (Johnson 2010).

Last but not least, one is left to wonder what impact comprehensive immigration reform might have on the general [*212] phenomenon of governing immigration through crime. Immigration reform has been percolating in Congress for well over a decade. Unfortunately, current proposals on the table would increase, not decrease, the criminal law’s regulation of immigration with, for example, efforts to exclude and remove alleged “gang members.” At the same time, employers could be required to use a computerized database known as E-Verify to check the employment eligibility of all employees, which could make employer sanctions more enforceable and diminish the need for criminal measures.

In conclusion, Governing Immigration Through Crime offers important readings from influential legal and social science scholars critically analyzing the efforts of the United States to regulate immigration through the criminal laws. Although a few recent developments are not covered in the reader, the chapters aptly outline and succinctly criticize the increasing criminalization of immigration law in the United States.

April 26, 2013

If the Supreme Court Decides the Proposition 8 Sponsors Lack Standing, What Will Happen to Same-Sex Marriage in California? Part Two in a Two-Part Series of Columns

Cross-posted from Justia's Verdict.

In my last column (Part One of this series), I began to lay out what I think might (and should) happen if the U.S. Supreme Court decides that the Proposition 8 sponsors lack standing in federal court.  I explained my view that such a ruling is the best option for the Supreme Court because the voters of California, in enacting Proposition 8, cannot be said to have designated the sponsors as the People's agents-and agency is a key concept here-in that the voters did not do or say anything that manifested their assent to create a relationship of agency.  (It is on this crucial question of assent to agency where, as I explain in longer academic writings, I part company with thoughtful commentators, like Ed Whelan, who have argued that as long as the California Supreme Court today thinks that under the California constitution the sponsors are the People's representatives, it does not matter whether voters, when they enacted Proposition 8 in 2008, could have anticipated this principle of California law, which was not made clear until 2011.)

I also explained in Part One in this series of columns why I believe that if the Proposition 8 sponsors are found by the Supreme Court to lack standing, both the Ninth Circuit's and the District Court's rulings below should be vacated (that is, erased), and the plaintiffs (the two same-sex couples who sued in federal court in San Francisco) should get relief in the form of a "default" judgment that allows them, and them only (for the time being), to get their marriage licenses.  This result follows, I think, from the overall logic of the law in this area, as well as from what the U.S. Supreme Court said in Karcher v. May, in which a unanimous Court intimated that if the only defendant who is defending on the merits is found on appeal to have lacked standing all the while, the district court's adjudication of the merits of the plaintiff's claim should be vacated.

In the space below, I delve further into what might happen after it is determined whether the District Court's rulings should be left intact or undone.

Scenario 1: Judge Walker's Injunction Stands, and Is Read Broadly

Let us first imagine that the federal courts do not follow my suggested approach concerning Judge Walker's order.  I start with that possibility because I acknowledge that many (maybe a majority of) analysts assert (albeit, to my mind, without adequate explanation or justification) that District Judge Walker's injunction prohibiting the enforcement of Proposition 8 should  not be disturbed and should go into effect as is.  Suppose  that the injunction is left intact, and suppose that the injunction is read (as it certainly can be read) to apply not just to the named same-sex couple plaintiffs, but also to other same-sex couples.  What could happen then?

Well, to begin with, we could expect that neither the California Attorney General nor the Governor would contest this broad reading of the injunction.  And we know that the sponsors of Proposition 8 would not have any legal standing to object either (at least not in federal court).  The two county clerks who were named as defendants in the action, the clerks of Los Angeles and Alameda counties, would also probably be content to issue marriage licenses to other same-sex couples in those counties.

But what about the county clerks in other counties, counties that weren't named in the Proposition 8 lawsuit in Judge Walker's court?  If they feel bound by Judge Walker's order, and none complains, then perhaps Proposition 8 will not be enforced at all, and marriage will be available to all qualified same-sex couples in the state.

Yet, there are a few wrinkles here.  First, some individual who supports Proposition 8 might sue one of these county clerks and ask a court to clarify that Judge Walker's injunction does not apply to that clerk.  The plaintiff here might argue that the clerk in question is not bound by Judge Walker's injunction because he, the clerk, was not a party to that lawsuit and is not under the "control or supervision" (the term Judge Walker used) of any of the parties (such as the Governor.)  Any such suit would probably be brought in state court, because it's not obvious who would have standing in federal court to object to a clerk's issuing of same-sex marriage licenses.

Second, it bears noting that some county clerks represent, and have been elected in, counties that strongly support Proposition 8.  What if one of these clerks resists issuing same-sex marriage licenses, arguing that she remains bound by Proposition 8 until and unless a court tells her, specifically, otherwise?  If so, that clerk might then be sued by a same-sex marriage license applicant to get a determination of whether Judge Walker's order binds her.  Or she herself may even act proactively, going into court to ask for a clear ruling that she, the clerk, is not bound by Judge Walker's injunction or, if she is, to ask that the injunction be reopened because she didn't have a chance to participate in the proceedings Judge Walker's court.

This may then raise the question whether local clerks have federal standing to defend Proposition 8 (and remember that they, unlike the sponsors, they are elected officials).  And even if they do, a similar question arises of whether they have the authority to take a position in court that differs from the position urged by the Governor and Attorney General (that Proposition 8 is unconstitutional.)  These two related questions are tricky, and would likely require additional input from the California Supreme Court, which would take time.

My provisional sense is that it should be rare for any lower executive official in California to be able to take a legal position in court contrary to that which is being asserted by the Governor on the question of the meaning or validity of a statewide law; in a seminal ruling in 1981 (when Jerry Brown was Governor the first time!), the California Supreme Court ruled that even the state Attorney General (elected to be the chief legal officer of the state) could not take a position adverse to the Governor's in court because under the State Constitution, the Governor retains the "Supreme Executive power" to determine the public interests, and under state statutes he is to "supervise the official conduct of all executive and ministerial officers."  It may well be that county clerks are deemed executive and/or ministerial officers for these purposes, and thus are subject to gubernatorial control with respect to the positions taken in court.  It wouldn't make much sense, to me, to give locally elected county clerks more authority than the state's chief legal officer, the Attorney General, to defy the Governor in court, unless we conclude that county clerks are autonomous like charter cities, which have some independence from state control.

But as I suggested above, all this would take time to sort out (especially if any of the proceedings take place in federal court, and the federal judges feel the need to seek input from the California Supreme Court by way of certification, the device the Ninth Circuit used to get state court input on the question of sponsor standing.)

Or maybe all of these problems could be avoided if all same-sex couples seeking to be married are willing to go to Alameda or Los Angeles counties where licenses might be freely issued. Perhaps that would effectively nullify Proposition 8.  But it would also impose its own set of inconveniences on some couples.

Scenario 2:  Judge Walker's Broad Injunction Is Either Read Narrowly to Apply to the Named Plaintiffs Only, or Replaced by a Narrower One That by Its Terms Applies to the Named Plaintiffs Only

Now let us imagine that the course that I argue is the correct legal one is followed, and that whatever injunction is in force is issued (or construed) to award marriage licenses to the named plaintiffs only.  Then what?  One possibility is that county clerks, at least in counties that strongly oppose Proposition 8, would simply decide to start issuing same-sex marriage licenses generally even though no court order is directing them to do so.  While that is imaginable politically, I think it runs into legal barriers.  Indeed, that is precisely the action that was taken by the county clerk in San Francisco in 2004 (at SF Mayor Gavin Newsom's urging) but that was repudiated unanimously by the California Supreme Court in Lockyer v. San Francisco.  There, a majority of California Justices emphatically rejected the idea that a "local executive official, charged with the ministerial duty of enforcing [state law,] has the authority to disregard the terms of the [state law] in the absence of a judicial [directive], based solely upon the official's opinion that the [law] is unconstitutional."  So I don't think that county clerks could, or should, simply start disregarding Proposition 8 on their own.

But what if the Governor were to try to direct county clerks not to implement Proposition 8?  Again that might be politically plausible, but would it fly legally?  For starters, what about the Lockyer ruling?  Strictly speaking, the issue presented in Lockyer involved the power of local executive officials, not that of the Governor, but Justice Werdegar's separate writing in that case understood the majority opinion to sweep broadly and apply not just to local executive officials but to the entire executive branch:  "Make no mistake, the majority does . . . hold[] that [all] executive officers must follow statutory rather than constitutional law until a court gives them permission to do otherwise in advance."

Even if the Governor is not covered by the Lockyer opinion, there is still a question under California law about whether locally elected county clerks enjoy some autonomy from gubernatorial control in their performance of their duties.  I suggested above that perhaps a county clerk may not take a position in court that is adverse to the Governor's on the validity of a state law, but there may be a distinction between having control over the legal positions asserted in court, and having control over enforcement of the law itself.

Indeed, such a distinction (between declining to enforce and declining to defend in court) is hinted at in another potentially important piece of law that may constrain the Governor here, Article III, Section 3.5 of the California Constitution.  It provides that no "administrative agency [even one created by the State Constitution] has . . .power . . . to refuse to enforce a statute, on the basis of its being unconstitutional, unless an appellate court has made a determination that such a statute is unconstitutional."  Does this provision prevent the Governor from directing officials (even if they are otherwise under his control) not to enforce Proposition 8 until an appellate court determines Proposition 8 is unconstitutional?

It might, and it might not.  Is the Governor an "agency" within the meaning of Article III, section 3.5?  The Attorney General has issued advisory opinions that offer one possible definition of "agency" here that is broad enough to include, essentially, all state-level executive operations, and there is no doubt that the Governor is quintessentially executive and operates at the state, rather than the local, level.  At least one California court case seems to apply section 3.5 to another statewide elected official, the State Controller.

What about section 3.5's reference to refusal to enforce a statute?  Could one argue that section 3.5 does not apply to the Proposition 8 setting because Proposition 8 is a state constitutional provision, rather than a statute?  I don't think this argument would work.  First, and most important, it would be odd as a policy matter to favor the enforcement of state statutes over state constitutional provisions.  So the word "statute" here would probably be read to also include state constitutional provisions that are alleged to violate the federal Constitution.

Second, there may be an argument that Governor Brown would be refusing to enforce a regular statute-Proposition 22-were he to order the issuance of same-sex marriage licenses. Proposition 22 is the statute (a statutory initiative known as the Knight initiative) banning same-sex marriage that the California Supreme Court held unenforceable when it ruled in May of 2008 that the state constitution protects same-sex marriage.  But since Proposition 8 amended that part of the California constitution that rendered Proposition 22 unenforceable, perhaps one could contend that Proposition 22 is now a valid statute that would be protected by section 3.5.  A rejoinder to that argument could be that since, under the California Supreme Court's May 2008 decision, the Knight initiative was invalid when it was enacted eight years earlier (and we just didn't know that until 2008), it never was-and is not now-entitled to be considered a valid statutory enactment.  This is convoluted stuff.  And, as is true with the first scenario, all of this would have to be fought out in state court, and that would take time.

Finally, let us return to the distinction between the refusal to enforce a law, and the refusal to defend the law in court.  Whether such a distinction is a sensible one to draw, notice again that section 3.5 speaks only to the former, and does not seem to impose a duty on the Governor (even if he is an agency), or the Attorney General, to defend any measure challenged in court.  So, under Scenario Number 2, imagine that a new lawsuit, a statewide class action consisting of all same-sex couples in the state who desire to get married, is brought to challenge Proposition 8 on federal constitutional grounds (just as the two couples did in Judge Walker's court).  If such a class action were to be brought in federal court, and if the Attorney General and Governor were to decline to defend in that case (and assuming no county clerk could successfully intervene and take a position adverse to the Governor's), a default judgment protecting all same-sex couples would then issue, and Proposition 8 would be a dead letter even if were not repealed at the ballot box.  (It is also possible that such a class action could be brought in state court, alleging that Proposition 8 violates the federal constitution, but since state courts would permit the sponsors to defend the measure on the merits there, any ruling in favor of the plaintiffs would be less certain, and more time-consuming, than a default judgment.)

Thus, if the U.S. Supreme Court finds no sponsor standing in federal court, how broadly available same-sex marriage will be in California might still take some time to sort out.

March 30, 2013

Why The U.S. Supreme Court Should Not Fear That Denying the Proposition 8 Sponsors Federal Standing Will Weaken The Initiative Device (And a Few Other Thoughts on the Oral Argument in Perry v. Hollingsworth)

In the space below, I offer some quick analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court's oral argument on Tuesday in Perry v. Hollingsworth, the case in which same-sex couples challenge California's ban on same-sex marriage, the voter-adopted Proposition 8.

The Court Was Presented With a False Dilemma Concerning Sponsor Standing

Over the last couple of years, I have written in a number of essays (including this one) that I think that the Proposition 8 sponsors should not enjoy standing in federal court to defend the measure, even though the California Attorney General and Governor have failed to defend.  As I have explained, the Proposition 8 sponsors were never elected nor appointed by the voters, and are not accountable to them.  For these and various other related reasons, the sponsors are not appropriate representatives for the State of California.  In short, initiative proponents who are not picked by the voters may lack credibility, and may in fact be rogue actors whose current views, sentiments, and desires bear little relation to those of the electorate that adopted the initiative in question, much less the electorate that exists at the time when litigation is conducted.

At Tuesday's oral argument, many of the Justices (up to five or more, and especially the "liberal" Justices Ginsburg and Kagan) seemed to understand these problems, and so there may be a majority of the Court for the proposition that Article III's "case or controversy" requirement is not satisfied in the present situation.  Even if fewer than five Justices find sponsor standing to be a problem, the sponsor standing issue could drive the result of the case.  Imagine a split in which three Justices want to reverse the Ninth Circuit on the merits, three want to affirm on the merits, and three want to vacate the lower court ruling for lack of standing.  Under such a scenario, the three Justices who would prefer to reverse on the merits might nonetheless join the three who want to vacate for lack of standing, simply to erase a problematic Ninth Circuit ruling that they all feel should not remain as the law of the Ninth Circuit.

The best counterargument (and it came up at oral argument), in favor of sponsor standing, is that if sponsors lack standing to defend initiatives, then elected officials can wrongly "kill" initiatives by simply not defending the measures when the initiatives are challenged.  This is especially problematic because the initiative device (in those states that have it) is derived from a concern that elected public officials sometimes do not act in ways that are faithful to the people's interests and desires, such that direct democracy is needed.  And while most initiatives are a response to inaction (or unpopular action) by the legislative branch, there is no reason to think that the distrust of elected officials that is represented by the initiative mechanism does not also carry over to elected executive officials like Governors and Attorneys General. (Consider, for example, an initiative limiting the terms of all elected officials, including executive officials. An Attorney General's self-serving decision not to defend such a measure would rightly be viewed with great public outrage.)

So, a few Justices (perhaps especially Justice Sotomayor) worried aloud, if sponsors are not allowed to defend initiatives in federal court, then the initiative device could be gutted.  But this framing of the issue ignores a key middle ground position:  that state law can authorize sponsors to defend initiatives (in a way that federal courts will respect and accept), but the authorization has to be done carefully and in a way the voters can see.

In fashioning a workable balance between the competing concerns presented by initiative-sponsor standing, the federal courts should recognize the possibility of sponsor standing, but only when the conferral of the power to sponsors to defend an initiative is clearly provided for in state law, and addresses some of the theoretical and logistical problems raised by sponsor standing. Such a rule gives voters adequate notice that when they adopt an initiative, they are in effect appointing certain persons to defend it in court.

Decisions issued in years past by the California courts that permit, but do not discuss, sponsor standing seem inadequate to confer notice on the voters since, as the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, rulings that tolerate but do not affirmatively discuss and affirm a court's jurisdiction over a matter are not entitled to any precedential weight. Instead, the appointment should be effected by a provision in a particular initiative (passed by the voters) that explicitly deputizes a particular proponent of that initiative (creating authorities and fiduciary duties that the proponent must honor) as the party entrusted to defend the constitutionality of the law. It would be sensible for such explicit deputization to  address, among other things:  (1) precisely who within the proponent organization(s) is entitled to make key litigation decisions and concessions; (2) how long the sponsor's power to defend lasts; (3) the question of attorneys' fee liability to be satisfied by public fisc if the defense fails; and (4)   what the relative authority of the initiative proponent and the Attorney General/Governor should be when public officials may decide to defend the measure, but to defend it in ways that are different from the litigation strategy favored by the initiative sponsors.

Or, the necessary appointment could take the form of a state statute or state supreme court opinion directly announcing clear standing rules for all initiatives from that point on. So, in light of the decision by the California Supreme Court in 2011, perhaps going forward voters in California should know, and take account of, the fact that when they approve an initiative, they are, in addition to adopting whatever policy is embodied in the initiative, effectively appointing certain persons to represent them in court.  (In this regard, I note that the California Supreme Court ruling might not suffice even going forward, because it did not answer some of the key logistical questions about the length of time a sponsor has power to defend the initiative, etc.)   In any event, because such state law clarity was certainly not in place when Proposition 8 itself was passed in 2008 (and I note here that it was passed by a slim margin), the U.S. Supreme Court could easily conclude that the requirements of federal standing are not necessarily met by the proponents in the Proposition 8 setting itself.  The voters of California in 2008 cannot be said to have appointed persons whom the voters did not even know were being appointed at that time.

The Consequences of a Finding That the Proposition 8 Sponsors Lack Federal Standing

If the Court does dispense with Perry on standing grounds, the Ninth Circuit ruling would be vacated (erased), and the case would go back to the trial court.  The named plaintiffs would (and should) get their marriage licenses (because certainly the government must give a plaintiff the relief she seeks when it defaults, that is, refuses to defend against her challenge).  But the extent to which other Californians would be free from Proposition 8-and when that might happen-depends upon many complexities, including the Governor's reaction to a ruling based on lack of standing, a potential state-wide class action lawsuit, and also the wild-card possibility that certain elected county clerks (these might be the "other people" to whom Chief Justice Roberts referred during oral argument) may be granted standing to defend Proposition 8 if it continues to be enforced in the State yet not defended by the Attorney General and Governor.  The procedural entailments of a Supreme Court ruling on standing grounds are themselves very complicated, and the only reason that they weren't explored much more at oral argument this week was, I expect, the constraint of the limited argument time.

What About the Option of Dismissing the Case Altogether At the Supreme Court?

If the Court doesn't want to reach the merits of the Proposition 8 challenge, it has another option as well-to dismiss the writ of certiorari as "improvidently granted."  Under this approach, the high Court would simply decide, upon closer inspection, that it was a mistake to grant review in the case in the first place, and undo that grant.

A dismissal is possible, but this course of action would need to overcome a few hurdles.  First, ordinarily speaking, for the Court to dismiss a case as improvidently granted (or, to "DIG" it, in Supreme Court parlance), at least six Justices would have to agree.  If four Justices want to keep the case, they typically can, since those same four Justices were all who were needed to grant review in the first place (pursuant to something known as the "Rule of Four.")  To preserve the integrity of the Rule of Four, the Court has traditionally taken the view that at least one of the Justices who voted to grant review (and more than one, if there were more than four votes to grant) would have to be among the majority who want to DIG the case.  And at oral argument, Justice Scalia seemed to believe he spoke for at least four of the Justices who voted to grant review when he suggested that the grant was water under the bridge (his actual words were that "we have crossed that river.")  So unless Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts both want to DIG the case (assuming one or both initially voted to grant review), mustering a DIG would seem to be hard.

Another reason a DIG may be difficult is that, unlike a ruling that the initiative sponsors lack standing, a DIG would leave the Ninth's Circuit's ruling intact.  The Ninth Circuit ruled that Proposition 8 was constitutionally irrational because: (1) it repealed an existing state-law right to same-sex marriage (rather than simply declined to recognize one); and (2) California had done so much to equalize the treatment of gay and straight couples that it no longer had any good reason for not extending the marriage label to gay couples.  None of the Justices seemed to think that this reasoning made sense.  (Justice Kennedy called it "very odd," and Justice Alito asked if the plaintiff's lawyer was "serious" about this argument.  Even Justice Breyer voiced concern over the perverse incentives it creates.)  Because the Ninth Circuit's ruling could have non-trivial spillover effects in other Western states outside of California and/or externality effects on rights other than the right to marry, many Justices may not want to leave it on the books.

My focus on the procedural issues in Perry in no way suggests the merits discussion at oral argument was unimportant or uninteresting.  But space constraints require that I defer them-and a discussion of the oral argument in the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) case, Windsor v. U.S.-until future writings.

Cross-posted from Justia's Verdict.

February 26, 2013

Do Civil Rights Laws Become Invalid If They Work?

By Prof. Gabriel "Jack" Chin for ACSblog.

Tomorrow, the Court will hear argument in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, which raises the question of the continuing validity of the preclearance requirement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.

Under Section 5, electoral changes in covered jurisdictions are suspended until the Attorney General or the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia preclears them by determining that they have neither the purpose nor effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.  The specific issue is whether circumstances in the covered jurisdictions have changed so dramatically that Section 5 is no longer warranted; the Court suggested as much in their 2009 decision in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One (NAMUDNO) v. Holder

I strongly disagree, and believe that a facial challenge is improper because Section 5 is clearly permissible in federal elections.  As important and ominous as Shelby County is, there is a larger question about the Court’s reasoning which has the potential to undermine many other laws and constitutional principles protecting civil rights. 

The Court’s logic in NAMUDNO seems to be this: There was a problem with discrimination against racial minorities at the ballot box, particularly in certain jurisdictions.  Section 5 and other parts of the Voting Rights Act largely fixed that problem.  Because covered jurisdictions are no longer disproportionately proposing electoral rules or districting maps that have the purpose or effect of disadvantaging minority voters, Section 5 may have outlived its usefulness.  Laws must be necessary and proper to solve problems, not non-problems, or former problems. (Many of these facts are doubtful, but I am concerned here primarily with the Court’s logic).

The Court has made similar arguments with respect to the exclusionary rule, which requires the suppression of evidence seized in violation of the Constitution.  The Court noted that before the exclusionary rule, there was no other realistic alternative to judicial suppression. But now that there is judicial suppression, police agencies train their officers not to illegally search and seize.  Therefore, it is implied, perhaps it is time for the exclusionary rule to go, because the police themselves are training their officers to comply with the law.

The flaw in these arguments is that they do not account for the effects of the laws themselves.  If Section 5 works, the Court should expect it to deter improper electoral changes because they will not be precleared, and thus will never go into effect.  Similarly, an effective exclusionary rule should change police training and policy because police leaders have an interest in teaching officers to develop admissible, as opposed to inadmissible, evidence.  Only if legislators and police are invulnerable to incentives and oblivious to outcomes would they stubbornly adhere to tactics long after they are penalized under law.  

That measures designed to bring about change achieve that change says nothing about whether those measures are no longer necessary.  If burglaries decline for ten years after homeowners install good door and window locks, that does not imply that locks have become superfluous.  If speeds on a road decrease after a speed limit is set and posted, that does not imply that speeds will remain low even if the speed limit were removed.  If laws do not change behavior, there is little point in having them.  If laws do change behavior, that does not necessarily mean that the underlying motivations and values which led to the behavior no longer exist.

Accordingly, the question is not simply whether the law worked, or created incentives to which the lawbreakers responded.  One question is whether the law (or other social forces) has changed public attitudes or conditions on the ground to such a degree that the law is unnecessary.  Another is who gets to decide.     

Section 5’s validity might turn on a prediction about politics -- will jurisdictions which once discriminated leap at the first chance to discriminate again, or will they welcome minority voters with open arms?  The continued existence of racially polarized voting and the political utility to Republicans of suppressing the minority vote -- whether out of malice or simple recognition of how they are likely to cast their ballots -- precludes any confident conclusion that eliminating Section 5 would not revive the practices Section 5 was intended to suppress.  But even if the point is debatable, Congress is in a far better position than is the Court to determine facts, political realities and public attitudes relevant to a prediction about what would happen if Section 5 disappeared.   For this reason, and many others, the Court should defer to the political judgments of the political branches and leave Section 5 as it is.

February 14, 2013

Does BLAG Have Standing in the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) Case in Front of the Supreme Court?

From Justia's Verdict.

In about six weeks, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in two potentially blockbuster same-sex marriage cases. In one case, Hollingsworth v. Perry, the plaintiffs challenge California’s voter-adopted ban on same-sex marriage (Proposition 8), and in the other, United States v. Windsor, the plaintiffs contest the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which prevents any agency of the United States from recognizing same-sex marriage for purposes of federal law, even in instances (such as that presented by Windsor) where the state in which the same-sex couple resides itself recognizes the same-sex marriage.

On the merits, both cases involve complex issues of liberty, equality, and (perhaps) federalism. Yet both cases also present tricky procedural obstacles that might dissuade (or prevent) the Court from reaching the merits. In the Proposition 8 case, the key procedural question is whether the sponsors of the Proposition 8 initiative have standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution to defend the measure against constitutional challenge in federal court where, as here, the state elected officials who would normally be expected to defend state laws (the California Attorney General and Governor) have, in this instance, declined to do so. I have written extensively before (most recently here) about why, even if in some circumstances initiative sponsors should be conferred standing in federal court, I feel that there are good arguments that the Proposition 8 sponsors were never deputized by the voters of California, and thus should not enjoy federal standing in the present case. In the space below, I analyze the standing issue presented in the DOMA case.

The Background of the Windsor Case in the Lower Courts

Same-sex couple Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer were married in Canada and then moved to New York, where their marriage was recognized as valid. After Spyer passed away, Windsor sued the United States in federal district court to challenge the federal estate tax that she owed on account of the federal government’s failure (pursuant to the DOMA) to recognize her marriage under federal law. (Had the federal government considered her marriage valid, Windsor would have been entitled to the marital exemption to the federal estate tax.)

Not long after the suit was filed, the U.S. Attorney General notified Congress that he and the President had concluded that they agree with the position taken by Ms. Windsor, that DOMA is unconstitutional. The Attorney General stated that the United States would, however, continue to enforce DOMA until it is repealed or definitively declared invalid by the courts.

Because the Justice Department had made clear its intent not to defend DOMA in court challenges (even as it continues to enforce the terms of DOMA), an organization known as the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives (BLAG) sought to intervene as a defendant in the Windsor case in order to present a defense, on behalf of the DOMA and the House, to Windsor’s challenge. The district court ultimately allowed BLAG to intervene in the case, and then ruled in Windsor’s favor on the merits. The Department of Justice and BLAG both appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, although the DOJ continued to assert its agreement with Ms. Windsor on the merits of her challenge. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court on the merits, and the Department of Justice asked the Supreme Court to take review. The high Court granted review, but in so doing asked for briefing on whether BLAG is a proper party in the case under Article III of the federal Constitution and (if not) whether the agreement between the plaintiff and the United States government on the merits of the lawsuit prevents the Court from rendering an opinion on those merits. The Court then appointed law professor Vicki Jackson of Harvard to provide briefing on these questions of standing and justiciability.

An Analysis of the Arguments Advanced in Professor Jackson’s Brief

Professor Jackson filed her brief a few weeks ago, in which she argued that BLAG does not enjoy standing in federal court to defend the DOMA, and that in the absence of BLAG, the agreement between the U.S. government and Windsor should prevent or disincline the Court to address the merits of the dispute. (Of course, BLAG will respond with its own brief.)

As to the crucial question of BLAG’s ability to defend the DOMA when the executive branch won’t, Professor Jackson correctly identifies the 1983 Supreme Court case of INS v. Chadha as a key precedent in the area. There, the Court permitted the House and Senate to defend the federal statutory device known as the “legislative veto” when the federal executive branch refused to defend the device against constitutional challenge by a private person. A legislative veto is a mechanism by which one or both houses of Congress can, without involving the President, effectively block executive branch action after it has been taken but before it has gone into effect. In Chadha, the challenger and the federal executive branch both believed that the legislative veto gave Congress authority beyond what the Constitution conferred, and in so doing violated the principle of separation of powers. (On the merits, the Supreme Court agreed with the challenger and the executive branch, and invalidated the legislative veto in question there.)

Professor Jackson argues that the ability of the House and Senate to defend in Chadha is distinguishable from BLAG’s ability to defend in the DOMA case, for three reasons: (1) the statute being challenged in Chadha was one that conferred on each house of Congress particular powers (the ability to veto executive actions), and so Congress had a “special legislative prerogative” in defending the legislative veto, above and beyond the interest Congress has (presented by BLAG) in defending all congressional enactments; (2) both Houses of Congress participated in Chadha, whereas BLAG, at most, represents only the House of Representatives; and (3) in Chadha, pursuant to a federal statute, each house of Congress explicitly authored its chamber’s participation in the lawsuit, whereas there is no federal statute authorizing the House to participate, and the House of Representatives itself did not explicitly authorize BLAG to represent it until after the lower court had already processed Ms. Windsor’s case.

The first distinction is quite interesting. On one hand, the executive branch is in a particularly awkward position when it is asked to defend a statute that is not only arguably unconstitutional, but unconstitutional precisely because it invades the province of the executive branch vis-à-vis the legislature. In such circumstances where there is an institutional conflict of interest, it may be hard for the executive branch to give a robust defense, and we may not want to encourage the executive branch to defend the statute in a half-hearted way, but instead encourage (by allowing Congress to defend itself) the executive branch to stay out of the dispute altogether. (Notice that for these purposes, I am refining Professor Jackson’s first proffered distinction to focus not on the aggrandizement of congressional powers, but rather on the invasion of the executive’s powers. If Congress, for instance, tried to assert new powers to veto actions of the judiciary, the executive branch would not be placed in an awkward position, and so I think that the justification for congressional standing would be weaker than in Chadha, even though both settings might technically satisfy Professor Jackson’s criterion of the presence of a special legislative prerogative.)

On the other hand, Congress’ interest in having its laws defended certainly is not limited to those laws that specially empower Congress; many statutes that regulate or empower persons outside of Congress are very important to the congressional agenda as well. Moreover, four years after Chadha—in a case in which the Supreme Court held that a state legislature enjoyed standing in federal court to defend a measure when the state executive branch declined to do so, Karcher v. May—the statute at issue had nothing to do with expanding legislative powers, but instead required public schools to observe a moment of silence (which challengers argued violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment).

Professor Jackson tries to deal with Karcher on this point by asserting that because federal separation of powers principles “do not necessarily apply to the organization of state governments, judicially cognizable injuries for congressional and state legislators may differ.” It is true that state constitutions may permit state legislatures to do things that Congress cannot, but if the question is—as Professor Jackson rightly says it is—whether a legislature has any distinct interest that it is allowed to vindicate in federal court, Karcher does make it harder, though perhaps not impossible, for the Court to draw the first distinction that Professor Jackson offers.

Professor Jackson’s second and third bases for distinguishing Chadha are cleaner, I think. The second distinction—the need for both Houses of Congress, and not just one, to be involved before legislative standing is allowed—does draw support from the facts of Chadha (and those of Karcher, for that matter, where the leaders of both chambers of the New Jersey legislature intervened to defend), and also from the fact that Article I of the U.S. Constitution vests legislative power in a single “Congress,” to be comprised of two chambers. In the DOMA context, the House has no greater interest in defending the measure than does the Senate, so that the Senate’s absence from the litigation arguably undermines the House’s claim to judicial redress.

And as to the third basis for distinguishing Chadha—the need for actual authorization of a legislative chamber before anyone can assert federal standing on its behalf—Chadha is also quite different from the present situation, because both the House and Senate in Chadha explicitly authorized participation in the lawsuit. Moreover, although Professor Jackson’s brief doesn’t discuss Karcher in this regard, Karcher (even though it undermines Professor Jackson’s first distinction) is the best support for her third distinction—that formal authorization is required. In refuting the argument that leaders of the New Jersey legislature could not assert legislative standing because they were not authorized to do so, the Court in Karcher explicitly discussed how New Jersey law empowered the leader of each chamber to represent the body in court, and pointed out that the participation of the legislative leaders in that case was premised on that legislative authorization. Thus, in perhaps what is the Court’s most extensive discussion of legislative body standing (more elaborate than anything the Court said in Chadha), the Court indicated the need for authorization by the body in question for that body to participate. This is particularly important, because the Court has often observed that what it has done with regard to justiciability issues in past cases is much less important than what it has said when it was explicitly addressing such issues.

As an aside, I note that in concluding in Karcher that New Jersey law authorized the legislature to participate when the executive branch isn’t defending, the Court cited a New Jersey case that really didn’t support the U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusion: the New Jersey case that was cited involved the legislature participating alongside the executive branch, not in lieu of it, in defending a state statute. But even if the U.S. Supreme Court’s reading of New Jersey law was flawed, the important point here is the Court’s insistence that there be legislative authorization before legislative body standing can be permitted. And, in the present case, as Professor Jackson points out, the House’s formal approval of BLAG’s representation of it did not come until very late in the day—indeed, after the Supreme Court had granted cert. Moreover, there is no federal statute, akin to the state law the Court found to be present in Karcher, that authorizes the House to be involved at all.

How Will the Court Resolve the Issue of BLAG’s Standing or Lack Thereof?

 None of this is to say Professor Jackson’s arguments will necessarily carry the day. As noted above, BLAG will have a chance to present its counterarguments. Moreover, because the Supreme Court itself hasn’t been careful and/or fully explanatory in cases in which it has permitted individuals outside the executive branch to defend congressional statutes when the executive branch won’t, the Court is writing on a slate with some support on both sides of the ledger, and that gives it some wiggle room to support a decision either way.

 For example, in Dickerson v. U.S., the federal executive branch and the criminal defendant both agreed that the statute on which the Court of Appeals had relied was unconstitutional, and the judgment below should be reversed. And yet the Supreme Court nonetheless reached the merits of the case, by appointing a law professor to write a brief defending the statute. It is true, as Professor Jackson points out, that Dickerson (unlike Windsor) was not a case in which the United States sought Supreme Court review, but the fact remains that the Supreme Court in Dickerson resolved the merits of the dispute, without ever explaining why a “case or controversy” within the meaning of Article III was in existence at the time of its ruling, in light of the fact that both parties agreed that the law was unconstitutional and that the result below was wrong.

Another case that creates additional murkiness is the 2011 decision in Camreta v. Greene, in which the Court said that individual executive branch government officials had standing to appeal a decision by a lower court that had ruled in their favor on a damage claim against them, but that had also found their actions unconstitutional, because the officials had a cognizable interest in being able to perform their public duties unburdened by a wrongheaded judicial ruling. If individual executive branch officials (as distinguished from the executive branch representing the government more generally) have such an interest in being able to do their jobs the way that they want to and think is permissible, then why shouldn’t individual legislators or legislative chambers have the same interest? Members of Congress want to be able to do their jobs—vote on bills—without being affected by wrongheaded judicial rulings, and yet individual members of legislatures clearly have no standing. In short, the Court has not been clear or coherent in this corner of standing law, any more than it has in the overall doctrine of Article III standing. (Indeed, the Court has never adequately explained what the specific objectives of standing and other justiciability doctrines should be, and instead has offered only vague invocations of separation of powers.)

Still, this softness in standing doctrine may be something that the Court can use to its advantage. My guess is that the Court is not particularly eager to take up the merits of the DOMA case and has granted review only because a few federal appeals courts had held the DOMA invalid. By contrast, had the lower courts upheld the DOMA, I would have been surprised to see the Court grant review. The Court’s disinclination to resolve the DOMA merits may stem in part from the fact that—unless the Court were to strike down the DOMA purely on federalism grounds, as the First Circuit seemed to do—any ruling either upholding or invalidating the DOMA would likely have significant analytic implications for the laws in all the dozens of states that ban same-sex marriages. And the Court may not want to resolve the legality of all these state laws until more states come to rest on this question. (That is why the Court may be similarly hesitant to resolve the merits of the Proposition 8 case.) For these reasons, I won’t be surprised if the Court (or a large enough number of individual Justices on the Court) effectively defers these cases and avoids issuing dispositive rulings on the merits using the flexible justiciability doctrine. Such a move may buy the Court only a few years, but on this social question in particular, the pace of change across the national landscape has been remarkably rapid.

December 21, 2012

How a Case About Decriminalization of Marijuana Has Substantial Implications for the Rights of Gay and Lesbian Persons

With co-author Alan E. Brownstein. Cross-posted from Justia's Verdict.

Two of the biggest storylines from last month’s elections involved battles over same-sex equality rights and the decriminalization of marijuana.  On the surface, these two topics seem to have little in common.  But the intense controversies they are generating on the American political landscape arise from a similar kind of generational and demographic divergence of attitudes between older, whiter, Red-state voters on the one hand, and younger, more racially diverse and more Blue-state voters on the other.  Both issues also raise prominent questions about federalism:  the relationship between state laws and state experimentation with federal supremacy and uniformity.  And, as we explain in more detail in this column, the two controversies continue to be connected in unnoticed and unexpected ways.

SB 1172—California’s Attempt to Rein in Sexual Orientation Change Efforts (SOCE)

Take, for instance, an important legal development in the same-sex equality arena. We speak here not of the important decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court two weeks ago to accept review in cases involving California’s ban on same-sex marriage, Proposition 8, and the federal law defining marriage for federal purposes as being between only a man and a woman, the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).  Instead, we are referring to a recent pair of federal district court decisions from Sacramento addressing constitutional challenges to SB 1172, an attempt by California to protect gay and lesbian teens by prohibiting mental health providers from engaging in so-called “conversion therapy.”

Finding that “[a]n individual’s sexual orientation, whether homosexual, bisexual, or heterosexual, is not a disease, disorder, illness, deficiency, or shortcoming,” and that “there is no evidence that any type of psychotherapy can change a person’s sexual orientation,” California lawmakers amended the State’s Business and Professions Code to prohibit these providers from undertaking “sexual orientation change efforts” (SOCE) with minors—defined as persons under the age of 18. The term “mental health provider” in the statute applies to a long list of state-licensed or state-registered mental health care professionals, such as psychiatrists, psychologists, and clinical social workers, as well as any other person who is designated a mental health professional under California law. “Sexual orientation change efforts” means any practices by mental health providers that seek to change an individual’s sexual orientation.

SOCE methods vary.  Some therapies, described as aversion treatments, involve the use of negative reinforcements including induced nausea, electric shocks, shame aversion and other aversion techniques.  Non-aversion treatments include the use of hypnosis and various educational and therapeutic efforts to facilitate and reinforce other-sex sexual behavior.

A number of affected mental health professionals sued to block the law’s enforcement on the ground that, because SOCE efforts often take the form of communication between therapist and patient, the First Amendment prevents the state from regulating what the content or substance of that communication can be.  One district judge (William Shubb) issued an injunction against the law’s implementation, agreeing with the plaintiffs’ argument, and another district judge (Kimberly Mueller), in a separate but similar lawsuit, declined to block the law, finding that its enforcement was unlikely to violate anyone’s free speech rights.

Importantly, whether one agrees with Judge Shubb or Judge Mueller depends in large part on how one interprets a decade-old case from the U.S Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that involved, you guessed it, state decriminalization of marijuana.

The Central Importance of a Marijuana Case to the Cases Relating to SOCE

The 2002 marijuana case, Conant v. Walters, involved a challenge to then-U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft’s policy of threatening federal investigation and revocation of federally granted prescription privileges for any doctors who “prescribe or recommend” to their patients the use of marijuana for medical purposes. The dispute arose because, in 1996, California adopted an Initiative (Proposition 215) that changed the State’s penal laws to decriminalize the use of marijuana by individuals who use the drug upon “recommendation” of a physician.  The Ashcroft Justice Department conceded that a state may choose to decriminalize whatever it wants to, under state law: What is criminal under California’s law is for California to decide. But Ashcroft pointed out that any possession and use of marijuana – which is federally classified as a Schedule I controlled substance, for which there are no permissible uses – remains a violation of federal criminal law, no matter what the status of marijuana use may be under state law, and no matter whether the marijuana use is medically-related or not. (The U.S. Supreme Court later upheld this federal law, the Controlled Substances Act, or CSA, against a challenge contending that Congress did not have the power to regulate local, medicinal marijuana possession and use in 2003, in the well-known Gonzales v. Raich case.)

Based on the CSA, the Justice Department argued in Conant that a doctor who prescribes for, or recommends to, patients the use of such Schedule I controlled substances has forfeited his privilege to prescribe narcotics, a federally conferred license reserved, under the CSA, for doctors who act in the “public interest.”

The Ninth Circuit in Conant blocked the Ashcroft policy, with two judges opining that by prohibiting recommendations, the federal policy impermissibly interfered with the First Amendment rights of doctors to communicate with their patients.  The third judge, Alex Kozinski, who is often characterized as having libertarian instincts, joined in this First Amendment reasoning, but also argued that the Ashcroft policy violates the “new Federalism” cases—decided by the Supreme Court over the last few decades—that try to insulate state government from federal bullying. (More on that later.)

Why Conant Was Problematic Under First Amendment Theory and Doctrine

One of us (Vik Amar) wrote an essay that was rather critical of the Conant case when it came down.  Although the Ninth Circuit’s First Amendment arguments had surface plausibility, they did not withstand careful scrutiny:

As to the free speech rationale, the Ninth Circuit failed to satisfactorily acknowledge that the First Amendment has traditionally allowed the government to regulate the professions in content-based ways. There may be a right to speak out in favor of medical marijuana, but that does not mean there is a right to do so as a doctor.

Imagine, for example, that a lawyer—rather than a doctor—was “recommending” to his client the use of an illegal drug. Even though such a recommendation would be “protected” by the First Amendment in that the lawyer could not be arrested and jailed for his speech (unless he was inciting his client to imminent unlawful conduct), there is no serious question but that the lawyer could be disciplined by the State Bar (and possibly stripped of his license to practice law) on the basis of his actions. This discipline and disbarment would be completely consistent with the First Amendment.

None of this is to say that government can dole out prescription privileges based on political viewpoints or party affiliations or government loyalty oaths. Clearly, some content-based conditions attached to the privilege of practicing medicine would violate the First Amendment.

Moreover, if government is forcing or encouraging doctors to give inaccurate or misleadingly incomplete information to patients, then free speech and privacy principles may converge to call such regulation into constitutional doubt. For example, in the famous and controversial case of Rust v. Sullivan, where the Supreme Court upheld by a 5-4 vote the so-called abortion gag rule imposed on doctors receiving federal funding, the Court did not adequately address the way in which the conditions imposed on doctors may have led them to affirmatively mislead their patients.

After reflecting on the questions raised by Conant for a decade, both of us continue to think that, as a general matter and putting aside partisan manipulation and/or fraudulent speech, the regulation of professional conduct generally, and the regulation of medical practice in particular, does not (or at least should not) raise free speech concerns that require rigorous judicial review.

First, conceptually, it is often necessary to distinguish between speech acts and speech, between speech that is part of a course of conduct and speech that that is essentially and exclusively speech for First Amendment purposes. Sometimes these can be hard cases. But in cases involving professional regulation, they are often relatively easy to resolve.

Take one profession adverted to above—the legal profession.  Lawyers talk a lot. Indeed, much of what they do is undeniably describable as communicating. They argue in court to judges orally and in writing. They negotiate with other lawyers. They offer advice to clients. But the practice of law is heavily regulated. Lawyers are subject to a rigorous code of professional responsibility. The briefs they file in court are restricted as to size and content. The arguments presented in court are subject to judicial orders and judicial discretion. It is hard to imagine how the provision of legal services could operate even remotely smoothly if every rule and every judge’s decision limiting lawyer speech in some way required compelling justification because it was subject to rigorous judicial review under the First Amendment.  Instead, the practice of law is understood to constitute professional conduct—not speech—and the regulation of the practice of law thus rarely raises free speech issues.

Second, and more specifically to the SOCE case, it should be obvious that the entire history and tradition of common-law and statutory regulation of the medical profession flies in the face of any contention that the licensing or control of medical practice by state authorities violates free-speech guarantees.

Consider another example, this one involving health care professionals. Joe goes to Dr. Smith complaining of back pain. Dr. Smith tells Joe to go home and engage in a series of stretching exercises to cure his discomfort. Joe does so but his condition deteriorates. In fact, accepted medical practice rejects the stretching exercises recommended by Dr. Smith because of the excessive risk that performing such exercises would render most patients’ back problems considerably worse.

If Joe sues Dr. Smith for worsening his back pain, he would be bringing a conventional medical malpractice case. In such a case, Joe can recover civil damages against Dr. Smith if he can prove that Dr. Smith acted negligently (unreasonably) in his provision of medical services to Joe. Generally speaking, what constitutes accepted medical practice in the community sets the standard of reasonable care in a medical malpractice case, and a jury will be asked to determine whether Dr. Smith’s treatment failed to satisfy that standard of care.  And if Dr. Smith continued to tell patients with back problems to engage in these problematic stretching exercises, he would probably be called to account and disciplined by the State Medical Board.

Obviously, in this case, Dr. Smith’s recommended course of treatment involves speech. However, no one would think that this case raises a free-speech problem. There is no history or tradition suggesting otherwise. If the punishment of doctors who practice quackery had to be rigorously evaluated under the First Amendment lens, every malpractice judgment in a case like this one would have to be reviewed under strict scrutiny. The plaintiff or the State would have to persuade the court that the specific standard of medical care accepted in the state was much more than a reasonable way to promote public health. Instead, the court would have to be convinced that the standard of care was the least restrictive way to further a compelling state interest—an extremely difficult burden of justification to satisfy.  Put simply, this is not the way courts do, or should, treat medical malpractice or medical discipline cases.

Finally, there are important federalism concerns at stake here. While the federal government has the power to regulate medical practice (and that is why Conant probably was wrongly decided), for the most part, the regulation of the medical profession is a matter of state and local concern. Not all states may choose to regulate doctors in the same way. Standards of care may vary from state to state. Some states may follow California in prohibiting SOCE as a medical treatment. Other states may decide otherwise.

If the regulation of medical treatment involving speech requires federal constitutional review, however, control over the regulation of medical practice in these cases shifts from the state to the federal government, and from the legislature to the judiciary. It is federal judges who will decide whether the standard of care implemented by state medical boards or interpreted by local juries can be justified.  Federal judges would determine whether the harm allegedly caused by SOCE is adequately proven, or whether the harm caused to some patients by SOCE is outweighed by the alleged benefits experienced by other patients. And the decisions of those federal judges would be binding on every state subject to their authority. If this occurred, the dramatic expansion of free-speech doctrine (by its application to professional conduct involving speech) would substantially displace democratic decisionmaking and state autonomy.

Limiting and/or Distinguishing Conant in the SOCE Setting

We should note here that Conant was no model of clarity, and thus its application to the SOCE dispute could continue to generate differences of opinion, just as it did in Judge Shubb’s and Judge Mueller’s courtrooms. There is much language in Conant that could be read expansively to suggest that all communications between a physician and her patient, in the course of the provision of medical services, is protected by the free speech clause of the First Amendment and that, as a result, virtually any regulation of such communications must be justified under rigorous constitutional review.

But other parts of the Conant opinion suggest a more limited analysis. The Ninth Circuit conceded that recommending the medical use of marijuana should not be understood to be the same thing as aiding and abetting a violation of the Controlled Substances Act (which Congress could legitimately punish).  Recommending is not prescribing, said the Ninth Circuit.  Recommendation of marijuana does not necessarily make marijuana use a part of the ongoing medical treatment provided by the physician to his patient.

Pursuant to this argument, a physician recommending marijuana to his patient with the words, “You might consider marijuana as a way to control your nausea,” would be protected by the First Amendment. It would be a different case, however, if the physician instead told his patient, “This is what I want you to do. Purchase some marijuana. You can buy some at the dispensary on 4th St.  Whenever you feel nauseous, you should smoke a joint. Come back in two weeks and we will evaluate your course of treatment.”

We do not think this distinction really should have mattered in Conant, since both kinds of recommendations are undertaken by the doctor as part of his professional treatment of the patient, so that what is being regulated by the federal government was the conduct of the delivery of treatment services, rather than speech itself.  But we do acknowledge that because the Conant opinion seems in some places narrowly tailored to the specific regulation at issue there, it is not clear whether the Ninth Circuit would want Conant to extend the scope of the First Amendment protection of professional conduct to reach the SOCE situation.

Thus, while poorly written sections of the Conant opinion may justify an expansive interpretation of that decision—and it is understandable that Judge Shubb read it that way—there is also a plausible doctrinal argument for limiting the scope of Conant and distinguishing it from the free-speech challenges brought against SB 1172 and the regulation of SOCE. This is the approach taken by Judge Mueller—who pointed out that SB 1172 explicitly focuses on, and prohibits, the conduct of delivering a particular medical “therapy” or treatment—and it is one that the Ninth Circuit itself may embrace when it analyzes Conant if the SOCE cases are appealed (as is likely).

Another Important Link Between Conant and Same-Sex Equality, This Time in the DOMA Context

There is another important sense in which Conant—a marijuana case—may bear on same-sex equality cases, in particular, the DOMA case on which the Supreme Court recently granted review.  In Conant, Judge Kozinski argued in his concurrence that by revoking doctors’ licenses, the federal government was preventing California from decriminalizing marijuana in its chosen way. “In effect,” wrote Kozinski, “the federal government is forcing the state to keep medical marijuana illegal. [And] preventing the state from repealing an existing law is no different from forcing [it] to pass a new one [which everyone agrees the federal government cannot do]; in either case, the state is being forced to regulate conduct that it prefers to leave unregulated.”

As one of us (Vik Amar) explained when Conant came down, this reasoning is open to serious question:

If the federal government were forcing California legislators or police to regulate on its behalf, there would be a problem under existing Supreme Court cases. But the feds are doing no such thing. Instead, they are simply regulating doctors themselves, and telling California that it may not immunize doctors from otherwise valid federal regulation.

To see the fallacy of Judge Kozinski’s argument, imagine that California had decriminalized marijuana use not on a recommendation of a doctor, but rather only if a doctor participates in the actual administration of the drug (on the theory that only a doctor can ensure the dosages are truly medicinal.)

Certainly a doctor who assists a patient in actually using the marijuana can be regulated under federal law, notwithstanding that this federal regulation may displace – and thus make difficult the accomplishment of – California’s objectives. But if the feds can regulate doctors’ administration of marijuana in the face of California’s wishes, why can’t the feds regulate doctors’ recommendation” of marijuana even though California would prefer otherwise?

Whether Judge Kozinski’s argument was convincing or not, we observe today that it is quite similar to, and indeed in some ways the precursor of, the argument embraced by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in its case invalidating the DOMA: that by not recognizing same-sex marriages entered into in Massachusetts, the federal government was burdening and impeding Massachusetts’ decision to recognize same-sex marriages in violation of federalism principles.  The federalism argument in the marriage context may be more plausible than in the marijuana context (because marriage has traditionally been much more a function of state than federal law), but the analogy between the two settings remains, and those on both sides of the DOMA debate would profit from reading and assessing Judge Kozinski’s analysis in Conant.